The local content policy came into effect in Nigeria with the signing into law, on April 22, 2010, of the  Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development (NOGICD) Act to enable greater, indigenous contributions in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, and thus boost national benefits from that sector of the economy. Perceived foreign dominance and dependency in the sector prompted agitations by Nigerians who claimed that greater local participation in the petroleum industry business would trap financial benefits homeward, as well as create industrial capacity-building for wider developments. The argument was strong, with less than 5 per cent in-country service contribution to the petroleum industry businesses as at 1990, with claim that Nigeria was experiencing capital flights to the tune of over $380 billion, coupled with an estimated loss of over two million jobs to countries where services were out-sourced. In 1990, as if to kick-start a response to these agitations, the then Minister of Petroleum Resources, Prof. Jibril Aminu, enabled the first award of oil blocks to 11 Nigerian companies. Prof Aminu was obviously convinced that Nigerians having worked for decades under the tutelage of International oil companies (IOCs), had acquired enough requisite experience and skills to run indigenous outfits.
Though that decision created some portfolio companies, it gave birth to indigenous companies like Atlas Petroleum and Cavendish Petroleum, who nurtured their Oil Prospecting Leases to points where they now operate Oil Mining Leases. Later awards and acquisitions from 1999 saw new generations of indigenous oil companies like Famfa Oil Ltd, Seplat Petroleum, Oando Energy Resources, Monipulo Energy, Emerald Energy Resources, Belema Oil, Sahara Energy Exploration, and so many others, becoming players in the oil and gas fields. As at year ending 2012, a  total number of 109 Oil Mining Licenses (OMLs) and 92 Oil Prospecting Licenses (OPLs) had been granted indigenous operators. While these oil blocks are marginal fields, the figures represented just 11 per cent of the total leases with about 88 per cent still operated by the IOCs. To also empower local capacity in the oil services sector which is dominated by multinationals like Schlumberger, Haliburton and Baker Hughes, the federal government in 2003 enacted the Coastal and Inland Shipping (Cabotage) Act. The act, in principle, restricted the use of foreign vessels in domestic, coastal services and was aimed at promoting the development of indigenous vessel services along and within the Nigerian coastal channels.
The climax so far in the litany of reforms came last year with the signing of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA). But, of all the introduced acts the NOGICD, signed in 2010, promised to be more far reaching and for the grass-roots, in terms of skills development, jobs creation and business capacity building.13 years after signing the NOGICD Act in furtherance of previous initiatives to protect ‘national interests’, how has the industry fared? How do we compare the economy, skills acquisition, remunerations for the few jobs still available, working conditions, job security, environmental standards and safety, as well as the general security? The current poor oil production data compared with previous records, and the ominous invest decisions by IOCs that resulted in divestments from almost all onshore assets, are clear testimonies of an industry in retrogression. The federal government should be more circumspect in drafting policies in ways that do not draw bad sentiments and backlashes from international partners. One wonders why the current economic malaise and rapidly depreciating naira should mirrow those of the 1970s. Prior to 1972 when the federal government signed the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEPD) a.k.a Indigenisation Decree, the US Dollar paired 1:1 with the Naira.
In less than a decade after NEPD, the Naira crashed to between N99 – N105 per Dollar. A flip to the present times shows that, while in 2010 when the NOGICD act was signed with similar ‘indigenisation’ reforms that culminated in the PIA of 2022, the Naira was N122.26 per Dollar, but has crashed to more than N1,000 per Dollar. A look at Nigeria’s oil production landscape might help our reflections. Of the 2.48 million barrels per day (mbpd) produced in 2012 during the years of high oil production records, 900,800 barrels per day (bpd) came from offshore, deepwater  productions, representing 36.32 per cent of total production, while 1.5 mbpd came from the onshore and shallower water terrains. Of that 1.5 mbpd, local companies contributed only 276,000 bpd. It is obvious that the bulk of Nigeria’s oil production comes from onshore platforms, yet these are where the IOCs have divested from, and wherein local operators are supposedly waxing strong. What changed in the operations climate and why have production records not been sustained? While the production capacities of indigenous operators looked hopeful as at 2012, the expected revolution has not materialised to at least sustain the 2.48 mbpd of 2012. Meanwhile offshore production remains progressive.
Despite total production records dropping progressively to as low as 800,000 bpd last year, the Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board (NCDMB), claims Nigeria has attained 42 per cent total Nigeria content in the oil and gas industry with a 70 per cent target by 2027. Oil production is currently at 1.2 million barrels per day, a far cry from the 2.48 mbpd records of 2012, and Nigerians have lost jobs beyond 2010 levels even with rising population of youths. Apart from NCDMB’s Nigerian Content Development Fund assistance to part-finance onshore Floating Production Storage Offloading (FPSO) vessel integration facility, at the Lagos Deep Offshore Logistics Base (LADOL) which contributed to the EGINA FPSO construction, and the magnificent headquarters it built for itself at Yenagoa, Bayelsa State, the NCDMB has not initiated much transformations within the Niger Delta apart from a couple of training workshops and seminars. The NCDMB should roll out ambitious skills development programmes to create capacities that empower indigenous industries to create innovations and jobs. It should also investigate why the expected revolutions in the oil and gas industry which was to overspill into other industries, has not yet materialised, and instead there is retrogression occasioned by low oil production and job losses. The Trans-Amadi Industrial Layout, a former bee-hive of oil and gas activities, has become a ghost layout.
While the initiatives to enable indigenous participation in the oil and gas industry is in the right direction, the environment should be made conducive for technologically advanced IOCs to operate as skills reference peers who create hard and soft skills transfer. The successes of Asian nations were attained by giving international technologies free hand to employ local labour and resources to make profits, while developing the nations in the process. The capacity to ensure security of personnel, production facilities and products, as well as the ethical skills strength to maintain transparent, accurate  records, should be  NCDMB’s focus as an aspect of content input to reverse the onshore losses, rather than eulogising itself in a time the entire economy is drowning due to unpresidented levels of corruption within its area of supervision. The wings of the NCDMB appears clipped however in the new PIA, which makes the minister of state for petroleum head of board, the latter being a direct errand boy to Nigerian presidents who have become penchant for doubling as petroleum ministers. For former President Muhammadu Buhari and his minister of state to have handled that portfolio amidst eight straight years of poor performance without a solution, is enough reason for introspection.