This is a paper he presented in Port Harcourt at a forum organised by the Bureau of Public Procurement.

According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “procurement is the process of identifying what is needed; determining who is the best person or organization to supply this need; and ensuring what is needed is delivered to the right place, at the right time, for the best price and that all this is done in a fair and open manner”

Public procurement procedures often are complex. Transparency of the processes is limited, and manipulation is difficult to detect. Few people becoming aware of corruption complain publicly, since it is not their own, but government money, which is being wasted. Governments at federal, state, and local levels, spend significant public resources on procurement. Procurement at all levels of government in developing countries like Nigeria typically constitutes about 45 percent of the total Gross Domestic Product (OECD, 2006). These expenditures are critical to enabling governments to deliver goods and services to citizens, but they are also extremely vulnerable to corruption.

For almost a decade now there has been a significant international focus on corruption as a threat to economic and human development. Several multilateral organizations, like the UN, the World Bank, the WTO and OECD, aims at fighting the problem. So far, however, the strategies to transform the alleged practices of a state administration from corrupt to honest and clean have failed in most cases. There are several ways to explain this persistence of corruption. The time it takes to curb the problem may have been underestimated. There may also be a failure in the adjustment of anti-corruption strategies to local conditions. And finally, the incentives to implement the necessary measures may be poor among politicians benefiting from the current system.

However, in countries where corruption is a common problem it tends to disturb the market mechanisms and impede economic development. Corruption in public procurement makes the officials or the politicians in charge, purchase goods or services from the best briber, instead of choosing the best price-quality combination. The result may be construction projects several times as costly as necessary, or the acquisition of goods not actually needed. Hence, when aggregated to a macro-economic level non-optimal choices of contractors can have noticeable effects on the economy.

Also the efforts of public officials to get into position for obtaining bribes may represent a significant cost. Gifted youth often prefer jobs in the bureaucracy instead of more scientific professions, the allocation of public funds may be biased in favour of capital intensive sectors at the expense of health and education, and laws and regulations may be introduced just in order to obtain bribes. Even worse, public sector corruption has a pervasive impact on the poor since it reduces the funding available for social services and distorts public choices in favour of the wealthy and powerful, resulting in larger income differences between rich and poor.

Corruption, as an illegal activity, is difficult to define exactly as different attitudes and customs prevail, for instance when it comes to gift-giving and bureaucratic integrity. However, this paper is mostly concerned about the clear-cut cases, where no doubt about the misuse of public office exists. This is usually the case when the following conditions are all met.

1.First, the act must be intentional and in conflict with the principle of objectivity in public service performance. This implies that the rule that is broken is precise and transparent.

2.Second, the person who breaks the rule must derive some recognizable benefit for him/herself, his family, his friends, his tribe or party, or some other relevant group.

3.Third, the benefit derived must be seen as a direct return from the specific act of “corruption”.

CAUSES

The logic of incentives makes it reasonable to assume that human greed explains most of the bureaucratic corruption. However, in many developing countries, where monthly wages for ordinary officials often are less than $100, the actual need may be an equally prevalent reason. In some cases these wages represent a capitulation wage. According to Besley and McLaren (1993) capitulation wage refers to a situation where the government “capitulates” because corruption is endemic and monitoring does not function. Thus, it makes no sense to revise salaries and the government pays very low wages, aware of the bureaucrats’ ability to manage on bribes and stealing. The bureaucrats’ demand for bribes is understandable under such circumstances. Nevertheless, it is observed in many countries that officials covering their economic need by the help of bribes do not stop when they reach an acceptable standard of living.

The supply side incentives may appear less obvious because bribes often represent a significant cost to a company. Preparing for a tender is a costly and time consuming process and the company may not trust their winning chances on legal basis alone. A bribe may thus ensure that the company obtains the government contract. Corruption may also help companies obtain a de facto monopoly situation, to retain business, to obtain secret information, to counterbalance poor quality or high price, to facilitate trade or investment, or to create demand for goods that otherwise would not have been purchased. Other motives may be to reduce political risk, to receive import licenses, to reduce taxes and attain special modifications of laws or just to induce government employees to perform their duties. Despite the secrecy in these cases, it is not difficult to exemplify incentives from the media and court cases.

The major reason for bribery in public contract assignment, however, is probably because everyone believes that everyone else is involved in such kind of business. Losing a contract because a competitor bribed the officials must be very frustrating. This problem of hidden information is reflected in the way that all the companies involved pay a bribe even if they would be better off with no corruption (prisoner’s dilemma). Hence, the companies that bribe public officials seem to forget the negative externality they impose on other firms, as well as the worsening of their economic environment. For the company involved there are several common drawbacks related to bribery. One is the information about the bribery in hand of the public officials, information applicable to hit the reputation of enterprises, the multinationals in particular. A problem is also enforcement that a bribing company has no judicial guarantee of obtaining what it has paid for (unless the courts are corrupt as well). And, once a company has established a corrupt relationship it may be confronted by unexpected demands for additional payments. Ending a corrupt relationship is often difficult because of the risk of menaces, violence and other criminal activities. Apart from this, close connections to the government may imply a risk in case of political and governmental changes.

Adebowale, is the Managing Partner, Proactive Projective Limited.

Seun Adebowale