Opinion
Dimensions To Nigeria’s Food Crisis
Going by statements credited to Nigeria’s Vice President, Senator Kashim Shettima, that “some people are working to undermine the efforts of the President Bola Tinubu administration”, especially with regard to the rapidly rising costs of food items across the country, one begins to worry if the trend of economic difficulties that began since 2015, will ever be reversed, or at least be halted. 2015 was the year the All Progressives Congress party took over governance in Nigeria, led by former President Muhammadu Buhari.According to national media reports, Vice President Shettima had used the opportunity at a conference on Public Wealth Management which held in Abuja, to reveal the discovery of “32 illegal routes,” in Illela Local Government Area (LGA) of Sokoto state, through which smugglers freight commodities out of the country. The VP also disclosed that “45 trucks loaded with maize were intercepted while making their way to neighbouring countries at midnight on Sunday.”
While the discovery of 32 smuggling routes in one Local Government Area, (LGA) of Sokoto state alone is startling, it is disheartening to realise that the state has five other border LGAs where similar things happen – Gudu, Tangaza, Gada, Sabon Birni and Isa – and worse still, considering that apart from Sokoto, states like Kebbi, Zamfara, Katsina, Jigawa, Yobe and Borno all lie along Nigeria’s porous 1,608km border with Niger. The interception of 45 trucks in just a night in one LGA, makes unimaginable the enormity of the number of truckloads of food items leaving this country daily.The unpatriotic priority of supplying Niger Republic, even at the risk of smuggling across terrorist-infested borders, against pressing domestic demands, is another reason for concern, and puts to scrutiny the efficiency and patriotism of our border control personnel towards implementing extant government policies. How long has this been going on, or was it a recent development?
Or was it the result of calculated distraction from political antagonists to frustrate the present administration, as the VP tried to paint it? His picture looks appealing when correlated with the recent spike in the price of cement, especially. But how come it was the vice president who stole the show of making the revelation public, instead of the intercepting agencies? It is expected that the federal agencies whose duty it is to secure borders should have been proud to parade and announce such achievements to showcase the essence of their establishment. And from Mr Vice President, who went short of naming the culprits, but rather alluded to “knowing the consequences of revealing the masquerade”, many would have preferred he damned those consequences by revealing particulars, otherwise many are tempted to perceive him as merely propagandising facts in the face of a national crisis.
However, while pondering the above worries, it would be worthwhile to review the changing political and economic landscapes inside and outside Nigeria since 2015, to find out factors that might have been at play. Hitherto, Nigeria had enjoyed free, cross-border movements of goods and persons with Cameroon, Chad and with its Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) neighbours up until May 2015, when President Muhammadu Buhari came to power. These movements supported transverse trades up to Mali, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic and as far as Lybia. By July of 2015 the Buhari’s administration, poised to enforce home-grown production, had imposed cross-border restrictions, a situation that became more stringent following the COVID-19 pandemic lock-downs of 2020.
On the other hand, nationalist uprising in eastern Cameroon from 2016 culminated to the 2019 Ambazonian separatist movement that ever since, pitched the ‘amba boys’ in gorilla warfare with Cameroonian authorities. Buhari’s government corresponded with Cameroon to tighten border restrictions on both sides. For every step of restriction, commodity prices responded in increase, both in Nigeria and across the borders, increasing the inducement for smuggling, no thanks to porous borders and the usual “pay and pass” atmosphere. Border bribes get higher with restrictions, reflecting on costs as goods flow across. Nigeria, being a huge source of farm products, and for a long time a source of subsidised petroleum products, fed scarcities that intensified many miles off its borders. Accompanying and aiding smuggling was heightened islamists influx into Nigeria from the Sahel.
Greater numbers of maraudering Islamist gangs from Mali, Niger, Chad and the Central African Republic, acting either criminally on their own, or on brotherhood solidarities in the ethno-religious, farmers-herders or political conflicts in Nigeria, attack and plunder agricultural settlements. It has degenerated to current general insecurity, spate of kidnappings, and rapidly rising food prices. The spread of inflation across border was aided by the coup of August 18, 2020 in Mali, to which ECOWAS responded with economic sanctions. Mali with no direct border with Nigeria, has short connections through south-western Niger Republic. The overall game changer dawned since February 24, 2022 with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, followed by October last year’s out-break of Israel vs Hamas war in the Middle East. Ever since, global supply chains of grains, energy and raw materials have remained disrupted, shooting up everything from transportation costs to the value of foreign currencies.
Subsidy removal shocks on Nigeria’s poor transportation infrastructure, a sector daily threatened by insecurity, meant it was becoming more expensive to businesses in the north, compared to shorter cross-border routes which, in addition present prospects of higher gains. This becomes more obvious considering that the distance from Gboko in Benue to Bamenda in Cameroon is 443.7 Km, while from same Gboko to Lagos it is 795.9 Km, and 538.5 Km to Port Harcourt. Yola in Adamawa to Touruo in Cameroon is 229.5 Km, but it is 879.1 Km to Calabar and a staggering 1,327.4 Km to Lagos. Meanwhile, Illela in Sokoto can be crossed on bike or donkey into Birnin Konni, 5Km into Niger Republic, while the distance from Kano to Maradi in Niger is 268.2 Km, Kano to Abuja, 432 Km, and 992.2 Km to Lagos. Birnin Kebbi in Nigeria is 395.6 Km to Niger’s capital, Niamey, while being 658.4 Km off Nigeria’s, Abuja. In fact, smugglers utilise shorter segments, like in case of Illela to Konni, for higher round-trips.
According to reports, the amount of cross-border trades currently going-on across the Niger border is to the tune of N13 billion weekly, on items ranging from kusus, local flour, onions, tomatoes, pepper, potatoes, millet, maize, rice, jewelries to livestock, from which Nigeria losses revenues. The juntas in Niamey and Bamako, for all their militantness and recent pull-out from ECOWAS, let the illicit trades thrive. All these put together, it is easy to figure out the underlying factors to Nigeria’s economic woes, and to relate patterns with insecurity – Nigeria’s very porous borders have become more attractive in the face of rising haulage costs, as much as agro-production outputs are declining due to insecurity.The situation therefore calls for drastic measures to curb insecurity, transportation costs and smuggling, while massively investing in production. Even if it takes the tactics of ancient cities whose domains had to be walled-off with fortifications to achieve internal control and protection.
Yes, the flux across Nigeria’s 1,608 Km porous border with Niger Republic can, and should be checked with perimeter fortifications punctuated with approved access stations, and manned with surveillance technologies. Nigeria should also do same along its 809 Km border with Benin Republic and the 1,975 Km with Cameroon. With security concerns now gulping over N3.2 trillion in the 2024 national budget, a trillion Naira out of that bulk would fortify more than one flank of the borders to give our security personnel, beset by attack-and-withdrawal terrorists, a better chance at ending insecurity, and the border agencies, no excuses in discharging duties.
Joseph Nwankwo
From all indications, Nigeria possesses enough human and material resources to become a true economic powerhouse in Africa. According to the National Population Commission (NPC, 2023), the country’s population has grown steadily within the last decade, presently standing at about 220 million people—mostly young, vibrant, and innovative. Nigeria also remains the sixth-largest oil producer in the world, with enormous reserves of gas, fertile agricultural land, and human capital.
Yet, despite this enormous potential, the country continues to grapple with underdevelopment, poverty, unemployment, and insecurity. Recent data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2023) show that about 129 million Nigerians currently live below the poverty line. Most families can no longer afford basic necessities, even as the government continues to project a rosy economic picture.
The Subsidy Question
The removal of fuel subsidy in 2023 by President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has been one of the most controversial policy decisions in Nigeria’s recent history. According to the president, subsidy removal was designed to reduce fiscal burden, unify the foreign exchange rate, attract investment, curb inflation, and discourage excessive government borrowing.
While these objectives are theoretically sound, the reality for ordinary Nigerians has been severe hardship. Fuel prices more than tripled, transportation costs surged, and food inflation—already high—rose above 30% (NBS, 2023). The World Bank (2023) estimates that an additional 7.1 million Nigerians were pushed into poverty after subsidy removal.
A Critical Economic View
As an economist, I argue that the problem was not subsidy removal itself—which was inevitable—but the timing, sequencing, and structural gaps in Nigeria’s implementation.
- Structural Miscalculation
Nigeria’s four state-owned refineries remain nonfunctional. By removing subsidies without local refining capacity, the government exposed the economy to import-price pass-through effects—where global oil price shocks translate directly into domestic inflation. This was not just a timing issue but a fundamental policy miscalculation.
- Neglect of Social Safety Nets
Countries like Indonesia (2005) and Ghana (2005) removed subsidies successfully only after introducing cash transfers, transport vouchers, and food subsidies for the poor (World Bank, 2005). Nigeria, however, implemented removal abruptly, shifting the fiscal burden directly onto households without protection.
- Failure to Secure Food and Energy Alternatives
Fuel subsidy removal amplified existing weaknesses in agriculture and energy. Instead of sequencing reforms, government left Nigerians without refinery capacity, renewable energy alternatives, or mechanized agricultural productivity—all of which could have cushioned the shock.
Political and Public Concerns
Prominent leaders have echoed these concerns. Mr. Peter Obi, the Labour Party’s 2023 presidential candidate, described the subsidy removal as “good but wrongly timed.” Atiku Abubakar of the People’s Democratic Party also faulted the government’s hasty approach. Human rights activists like Obodoekwe Stive stressed that refineries should have been made functional first, to reduce the suffering of citizens.
This is not just political rhetoric—it reflects a widespread economic reality. When inflation climbs above 30%, when purchasing power collapses, and when households cannot meet basic needs, the promise of reform becomes overshadowed by social pain.
Broader Implications
The consequences of this policy are multidimensional:
- Inflationary Pressures – Food inflation above 30% has made nutrition unaffordable for many households.
- Rising Poverty – 7.1 million Nigerians have been newly pushed into poverty (World Bank, 2023).
- Middle-Class Erosion – Rising transport, rent, and healthcare costs are squeezing household incomes.
- Debt Concerns – Despite promises, government borrowing has continued, raising sustainability questions.
- Public Distrust – When government promises savings but citizens feel only pain, trust in leadership erodes.
In effect, subsidy removal without structural readiness has widened inequality and eroded social stability.
Missed Opportunities
Nigeria’s leaders had the chance to approach subsidy removal differently:
- Refinery Rehabilitation – Ensuring local refining to reduce exposure to global oil price shocks.
- Renewable Energy Investment – Diversifying energy through solar, hydro, and wind to reduce reliance on imported petroleum.
- Agricultural Productivity – Mechanization, irrigation, and smallholder financing could have boosted food supply and stabilized prices.
- Social Safety Nets – Conditional cash transfers, food vouchers, and transport subsidies could have protected the most vulnerable.
Instead, reform came abruptly, leaving citizens to absorb all the pain while waiting for theoretical long-term benefits.
Conclusion: Reform With a Human Face
Fuel subsidy removal was inevitable, but Nigeria’s approach has worsened hardship for millions. True reform must go beyond fiscal savings to protect citizens.
Economic policy is not judged only by its efficiency but by its humanity. A well-sequenced reform could have balanced fiscal responsibility with equity, ensuring that ordinary Nigerians were not crushed under the weight of sudden change.
Nigeria has the resources, population, and resilience to lead Africa’s economy. But leadership requires foresight. It requires policies that are inclusive, humane, and strategically sequenced.
Reform without equity is displacement of poverty, not development. If Nigeria truly seeks progress, its policies must wear a human face.
References
- National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). (2023). Poverty and Inequality Report. Abuja.
- National Population Commission (NPC). (2023). Population Estimates. Abuja.
- World Bank. (2023). Nigeria Development Update. Washington, DC.
- World Bank. (2005). Fuel Subsidy Reforms: Lessons from Indonesia and Ghana. Washington, DC.
- OPEC. (2023). Annual Statistical Bulletin. Vienna.
By: Amarachi Amaugo