Opinion
Nigeria And Debt Burden
Amidst conflicting claims that Nigeria external debt has blown up again after the country’s exit from Paris club, the House of Representatives summoned the Minister of Finance, Alhaji Mansur Mukhtar to appear before its ad-hoc committee on foreign loans on 16th February , 2010 to clarify issues pertaining Nigeria’s external debts .
Nigeria’s exit from the Paris club debt was in 2005/2006. of course the country’s debt dropped from what it used to be before the exit process commenced, the external debt stock stood at about United States $35.94billion by the end of December, 2004.
Murhktar urged the house committee to disregard insinuating of the increase in the country’s debt asserting emphatically that the debt stock dropped dramatically and substantially after the ccountry’s exit from Paris Club (in 2005/2006). He said ; “By end –December 2006. The stock was a much lower amount of USB 3.54 billion. The debt stock figure by end-december ,2007 was USD 3.65 billion, by end – December,2008 it was USD 3.72, and by end –December, 2009, it was USD 3.97 billion”.
It is worthy to note that….the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria did not specifically make provision on borrowing. However, under the second schedule, section 4, item 7, of the exclusive legislative list, the National Assembly is conferred with the powers to make laws in respect of borrowing of money within or outside Nigeria for the purpose of the federation of a state. Pursuant to this power the National Assembly has enacted the debt management Act, 2003 and the fiscal responsibility Act , 2007.
In particular , section 19 (1)and(2) of the DMO Act requires that the borrowing programme for every succeeding year be approved by the national assembly . In compliance with this requirement, the borrowing programme for fiscal 2010 has been included as part of the 2010 appropriation bill.
The Finance Minister clarify that state governments are not allowed to borrow directly from external source. And that a state government or its agency can obtain external loans only through the federal Government. (Fiscal Responsibility Act, Section 47 (3)). In accessing external loans, a government or its agency has to comply with the relevant guidelines and requirements which derives from responsibility Act and the DMO Act .These include: the national debt management framework , the external borrowing guidelines and the sub- national borrowing guidelines. External borrowing by the federal and state governments within the borrowing programme included in the budget are still subjected to these guidelines by the debt management office under the authority of the minister of finance .In essence , there is effective control to ensure compliance with the provisions of the constitution and other external laws and guidelines.
In line with the current national borrowing guidelines, Nigeria’s external borrowing since the exit from the Paris Club and London Club debts has been limited to concessional sources. These credits, essentially from the international development association(IDA) and African development fund (ADF) windows , of the World Bank and the ADB, respectively, have a 40-year repayment period including a 10 –year grace period. (Murkhtar said although several loans were considered, negotiated and processed between 2007 and 2009, only $1,831.60 billion became effective during the period. The total amount drawn down between 2007 and 2009 was $1,318.22 billion , which was made up of $880.89 million (disbursements on old loans contracted before 2007 ), and $437.33 million (disbursements on loans contracted between 2007 and 2009).
Part of the reason for the misunderstanding of Nigeria’s external debts , He said ,is the non- recognition that when Nigeria paid off its paris club and London club debts, it did not pay off its multilateral debts, as this was neither necessary nor desirable. Only the problematic and the odious component the external debt was cleared off.
Much of the external debts remaining after the exit from the Paris and London club debts are loans from multilateral financial institution (word bank, African development bank, international fund for agricultural development, etc). The loans from this source constitute about 85% of the country’s external debt stock as at march 31, 2009. It is pertinent to note that about 83% of the interest charges: service charge of 0.75%p.a and long repayment periods of 40 years and above, including a grace period of 10 years.
In view of their long tenors, implying gradual installment payments, it is obvious that some of the outstanding loans were contracted more than 20 years ago and cannot be contributed to the last few years. Indeed, some of the loans were contracted in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s for various infrastructural and social development projects. It is because their payments were scheduled to be gradual so as not to put serious burden of Fiscal resources, that part of them are still outstanding. That the loans have a long repayment period is beneficial, given the nature of the projects and services they financed – projects and services like basic education, health and rural water supply, as well as roads whose revenue-generating impact is at the best slow, small and indirect. More importantly, it should be noted that much of the loans were applied to the provision of social and infrastructural services over the years. There is no doubt that some of the infrastructure funded in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s are still useful assets to the people.
While the Post-Paris Club external debt stock has remained sufficiently restrained, it does vary up and down within reasonable limits even if no new loans have been incurred. This is because old loans could still be disbursing while, at the same time, repayments of principal amounts due could be taking place. The direction of the swing in the outstanding debt stock, therefore, depends on the net result of disbursements and repayments.
Nevertheless, the Finance Minister assumed that government is committed to ensuring debt sustainability and avoiding a replace into the pre-Paris Club debt exit situation. In line with this posture, the Debt Management Office has developed a National Debt Management Framework (NDMF) to guide the policy and strategy for external and domestic borrowing by the federal and states governments, as well as their agencies. The NDMF contains specific guidelines for borrowing, designed not only to limit borrowings to sustainable levels but also to ensure that there is a value for money and that the use of funds leads to the growth, employment and poverty reduction. Further, the DMO working closely with the Ministry of Finance, the CBN, the National Planning Commission and other agencies conducts annually, a Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) to keep track of the statics and dynamics of the public debt sustainability under changing local and external scenarios.
For the same reason, the DMO he said is making significant progress in implementing the Template foe helping every of the 36 States of the Federation.
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Fuel Subsidy Removal and the Economic Implications for Nigerians
From all indications, Nigeria possesses enough human and material resources to become a true economic powerhouse in Africa. According to the National Population Commission (NPC, 2023), the country’s population has grown steadily within the last decade, presently standing at about 220 million people—mostly young, vibrant, and innovative. Nigeria also remains the sixth-largest oil producer in the world, with enormous reserves of gas, fertile agricultural land, and human capital.
Yet, despite this enormous potential, the country continues to grapple with underdevelopment, poverty, unemployment, and insecurity. Recent data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2023) show that about 129 million Nigerians currently live below the poverty line. Most families can no longer afford basic necessities, even as the government continues to project a rosy economic picture.
The Subsidy Question
The removal of fuel subsidy in 2023 by President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has been one of the most controversial policy decisions in Nigeria’s recent history. According to the president, subsidy removal was designed to reduce fiscal burden, unify the foreign exchange rate, attract investment, curb inflation, and discourage excessive government borrowing.
While these objectives are theoretically sound, the reality for ordinary Nigerians has been severe hardship. Fuel prices more than tripled, transportation costs surged, and food inflation—already high—rose above 30% (NBS, 2023). The World Bank (2023) estimates that an additional 7.1 million Nigerians were pushed into poverty after subsidy removal.
A Critical Economic View
As an economist, I argue that the problem was not subsidy removal itself—which was inevitable—but the timing, sequencing, and structural gaps in Nigeria’s implementation.
- Structural Miscalculation
Nigeria’s four state-owned refineries remain nonfunctional. By removing subsidies without local refining capacity, the government exposed the economy to import-price pass-through effects—where global oil price shocks translate directly into domestic inflation. This was not just a timing issue but a fundamental policy miscalculation.
- Neglect of Social Safety Nets
Countries like Indonesia (2005) and Ghana (2005) removed subsidies successfully only after introducing cash transfers, transport vouchers, and food subsidies for the poor (World Bank, 2005). Nigeria, however, implemented removal abruptly, shifting the fiscal burden directly onto households without protection.
- Failure to Secure Food and Energy Alternatives
Fuel subsidy removal amplified existing weaknesses in agriculture and energy. Instead of sequencing reforms, government left Nigerians without refinery capacity, renewable energy alternatives, or mechanized agricultural productivity—all of which could have cushioned the shock.
Political and Public Concerns
Prominent leaders have echoed these concerns. Mr. Peter Obi, the Labour Party’s 2023 presidential candidate, described the subsidy removal as “good but wrongly timed.” Atiku Abubakar of the People’s Democratic Party also faulted the government’s hasty approach. Human rights activists like Obodoekwe Stive stressed that refineries should have been made functional first, to reduce the suffering of citizens.
This is not just political rhetoric—it reflects a widespread economic reality. When inflation climbs above 30%, when purchasing power collapses, and when households cannot meet basic needs, the promise of reform becomes overshadowed by social pain.
Broader Implications
The consequences of this policy are multidimensional:
- Inflationary Pressures – Food inflation above 30% has made nutrition unaffordable for many households.
- Rising Poverty – 7.1 million Nigerians have been newly pushed into poverty (World Bank, 2023).
- Middle-Class Erosion – Rising transport, rent, and healthcare costs are squeezing household incomes.
- Debt Concerns – Despite promises, government borrowing has continued, raising sustainability questions.
- Public Distrust – When government promises savings but citizens feel only pain, trust in leadership erodes.
In effect, subsidy removal without structural readiness has widened inequality and eroded social stability.
Missed Opportunities
Nigeria’s leaders had the chance to approach subsidy removal differently:
- Refinery Rehabilitation – Ensuring local refining to reduce exposure to global oil price shocks.
- Renewable Energy Investment – Diversifying energy through solar, hydro, and wind to reduce reliance on imported petroleum.
- Agricultural Productivity – Mechanization, irrigation, and smallholder financing could have boosted food supply and stabilized prices.
- Social Safety Nets – Conditional cash transfers, food vouchers, and transport subsidies could have protected the most vulnerable.
Instead, reform came abruptly, leaving citizens to absorb all the pain while waiting for theoretical long-term benefits.
Conclusion: Reform With a Human Face
Fuel subsidy removal was inevitable, but Nigeria’s approach has worsened hardship for millions. True reform must go beyond fiscal savings to protect citizens.
Economic policy is not judged only by its efficiency but by its humanity. A well-sequenced reform could have balanced fiscal responsibility with equity, ensuring that ordinary Nigerians were not crushed under the weight of sudden change.
Nigeria has the resources, population, and resilience to lead Africa’s economy. But leadership requires foresight. It requires policies that are inclusive, humane, and strategically sequenced.
Reform without equity is displacement of poverty, not development. If Nigeria truly seeks progress, its policies must wear a human face.
References
- National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). (2023). Poverty and Inequality Report. Abuja.
- National Population Commission (NPC). (2023). Population Estimates. Abuja.
- World Bank. (2023). Nigeria Development Update. Washington, DC.
- World Bank. (2005). Fuel Subsidy Reforms: Lessons from Indonesia and Ghana. Washington, DC.
- OPEC. (2023). Annual Statistical Bulletin. Vienna.
By: Amarachi Amaugo
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