Opinion
Civil Servants And Govt Housing Policy
Tonye Fuayefika
Previous governments in Rivers State, in their efforts to provide accommodation for the populace and embrace the global policy on Urban Housing Renewal Scheme, built low-cost houses at Ndoki, and Marine Base Waterfronts as a test case. The Marine Base Waterfront Housing Scheme was divided into three phases. As a follow-up of past government‘s effort, the Sam Ewang administration, embarked on the Igbo-Etche Housing Scheme, while the Peter Odili administration embarked on the construction of 1,000 housing units across the twenty-three local government areas of the state.
The original intention of government was to build and sell these houses to civil servants and other indigenes to alleviate the acute accommodation problem in the state. Accordingly, the Ndoki, Aggrey Road, and Marine Base (Phase 1) Waterfronts houses were sold out on owner-occupier basis, the Igbo-Etche. The 1,000 housing units built by the Odili administration also followed the same concept of owner-occupier basis.
In June 1996, seventy semi-detached two-bedroom flats constructed by the Ada George administration in 1993 were completed at the Marine Base Housing Estate (Phase II). Fifty of the flats were allocated to senior civil servants as official quarters, while the remaining twenty flats were given to the University of Science and Technology, Port Harcourt. This marked a drastic shift from the original policy to sell the houses on owner-occupier basis.
It is pertinent to point out that the Komo administration, in order to hurriedly complete the houses at the (Phases II) of the estate before leaving office, pressurised the contractors and so left many works uncompleted. Most of the houses did not have all the fixtures and fittings required. For instance, the road and gutter in lane one (opposite the Marine Base plank shed) and the main drainage for the estate were not constructed, while the transformer for the estate was not supplied. Twenty flats were connected to two or three shallow soakaways.
Tell-tale signs of leaking and broken ceilings, broken louvre blades, brought about by corroded and ill-fitted louvre frames, peelings, cracking and depressing floors, and dust from termite-eaten woods abound in most flats, which shows the low-quality materials and poor workmanship of the buildings. Even, necessary amenities such as portable water, central refuse receptacle, fence-wall and play ground for the comfort of residents of the estate were not provided for in the physical structures.
So also, past governments failed to register the allottees with NEPA. So the allottees were forced by NEPA to register with them and pay for new metres which unfortunately, had then risen to N25,000 per meter. The brunt of the above problem was borne by the allottees as several letters written to government did not yield any fruit.
Compared to other waterfront estates, the Marine Base (Phase II) estate was built on a very low, marshy, saline soil. No sand-filling was done. Apart from the buildings being hastily carried out, workmanship too was very poor. Workers waded through two to three feet deep of water to carry out construction work, and the porousness and mashiness of the soil has caused the buildings to crack in some flats. Right now, the houses are fast deteriorating and dilapidating, and the allottees have taken up the responsibility of maintaining the houses at their own expense, in addition to paying high rents to government.
Findings have revealed that from inception to this moment successive governments have not done any maintenance or renovation work on the said buildings. It was the allottees who took the onerous burden upon themselves to put in fittings and fixtures not provided by government. The policy implementation of owner-occupier principle will definitely justify all financial obligations made by the allottees concerning the maintenance of the buildings.
The population of Port Harcourt is increasing by the days hence, the need to embark on more new housing estates for the populace. Revenue derivable from the sales of flats in the Marine Base Estate (Phase II) will enable government to embark on the building of more estates to meet the ever-increasing housing needs of the state.
Already, the allottees have registered with the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN) scheme which entitled them to housing loan at the eventual release of the houses in view. The policy implementation of owner- occupier principles as pronounced in the allocation of the Phase III of the Marine Base Housing Unit, should also apply to the Phase II of the same estate.
It is a known fact that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a civil servant to build a house from his monthly salary. Thus, frustration arising from homelessness has sent many civil servants to a terrible life and untimely death. And since shelter is undoubtedly the third most important thing after air and food. The Rivers State government should consider the implementation of the Federal Government’s “Monetisation” Policy for Rivers state workers. This will definitely lesson the burden of the resident occupants of Phase II, and make their eventual retirement in service a worth while dream.
Fuayefika wrote in from Port Harcourt.
From all indications, Nigeria possesses enough human and material resources to become a true economic powerhouse in Africa. According to the National Population Commission (NPC, 2023), the country’s population has grown steadily within the last decade, presently standing at about 220 million people—mostly young, vibrant, and innovative. Nigeria also remains the sixth-largest oil producer in the world, with enormous reserves of gas, fertile agricultural land, and human capital.
Yet, despite this enormous potential, the country continues to grapple with underdevelopment, poverty, unemployment, and insecurity. Recent data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2023) show that about 129 million Nigerians currently live below the poverty line. Most families can no longer afford basic necessities, even as the government continues to project a rosy economic picture.
The Subsidy Question
The removal of fuel subsidy in 2023 by President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has been one of the most controversial policy decisions in Nigeria’s recent history. According to the president, subsidy removal was designed to reduce fiscal burden, unify the foreign exchange rate, attract investment, curb inflation, and discourage excessive government borrowing.
While these objectives are theoretically sound, the reality for ordinary Nigerians has been severe hardship. Fuel prices more than tripled, transportation costs surged, and food inflation—already high—rose above 30% (NBS, 2023). The World Bank (2023) estimates that an additional 7.1 million Nigerians were pushed into poverty after subsidy removal.
A Critical Economic View
As an economist, I argue that the problem was not subsidy removal itself—which was inevitable—but the timing, sequencing, and structural gaps in Nigeria’s implementation.
- Structural Miscalculation
Nigeria’s four state-owned refineries remain nonfunctional. By removing subsidies without local refining capacity, the government exposed the economy to import-price pass-through effects—where global oil price shocks translate directly into domestic inflation. This was not just a timing issue but a fundamental policy miscalculation.
- Neglect of Social Safety Nets
Countries like Indonesia (2005) and Ghana (2005) removed subsidies successfully only after introducing cash transfers, transport vouchers, and food subsidies for the poor (World Bank, 2005). Nigeria, however, implemented removal abruptly, shifting the fiscal burden directly onto households without protection.
- Failure to Secure Food and Energy Alternatives
Fuel subsidy removal amplified existing weaknesses in agriculture and energy. Instead of sequencing reforms, government left Nigerians without refinery capacity, renewable energy alternatives, or mechanized agricultural productivity—all of which could have cushioned the shock.
Political and Public Concerns
Prominent leaders have echoed these concerns. Mr. Peter Obi, the Labour Party’s 2023 presidential candidate, described the subsidy removal as “good but wrongly timed.” Atiku Abubakar of the People’s Democratic Party also faulted the government’s hasty approach. Human rights activists like Obodoekwe Stive stressed that refineries should have been made functional first, to reduce the suffering of citizens.
This is not just political rhetoric—it reflects a widespread economic reality. When inflation climbs above 30%, when purchasing power collapses, and when households cannot meet basic needs, the promise of reform becomes overshadowed by social pain.
Broader Implications
The consequences of this policy are multidimensional:
- Inflationary Pressures – Food inflation above 30% has made nutrition unaffordable for many households.
- Rising Poverty – 7.1 million Nigerians have been newly pushed into poverty (World Bank, 2023).
- Middle-Class Erosion – Rising transport, rent, and healthcare costs are squeezing household incomes.
- Debt Concerns – Despite promises, government borrowing has continued, raising sustainability questions.
- Public Distrust – When government promises savings but citizens feel only pain, trust in leadership erodes.
In effect, subsidy removal without structural readiness has widened inequality and eroded social stability.
Missed Opportunities
Nigeria’s leaders had the chance to approach subsidy removal differently:
- Refinery Rehabilitation – Ensuring local refining to reduce exposure to global oil price shocks.
- Renewable Energy Investment – Diversifying energy through solar, hydro, and wind to reduce reliance on imported petroleum.
- Agricultural Productivity – Mechanization, irrigation, and smallholder financing could have boosted food supply and stabilized prices.
- Social Safety Nets – Conditional cash transfers, food vouchers, and transport subsidies could have protected the most vulnerable.
Instead, reform came abruptly, leaving citizens to absorb all the pain while waiting for theoretical long-term benefits.
Conclusion: Reform With a Human Face
Fuel subsidy removal was inevitable, but Nigeria’s approach has worsened hardship for millions. True reform must go beyond fiscal savings to protect citizens.
Economic policy is not judged only by its efficiency but by its humanity. A well-sequenced reform could have balanced fiscal responsibility with equity, ensuring that ordinary Nigerians were not crushed under the weight of sudden change.
Nigeria has the resources, population, and resilience to lead Africa’s economy. But leadership requires foresight. It requires policies that are inclusive, humane, and strategically sequenced.
Reform without equity is displacement of poverty, not development. If Nigeria truly seeks progress, its policies must wear a human face.
References
- National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). (2023). Poverty and Inequality Report. Abuja.
- National Population Commission (NPC). (2023). Population Estimates. Abuja.
- World Bank. (2023). Nigeria Development Update. Washington, DC.
- World Bank. (2005). Fuel Subsidy Reforms: Lessons from Indonesia and Ghana. Washington, DC.
- OPEC. (2023). Annual Statistical Bulletin. Vienna.
By: Amarachi Amaugo