Opinion
Curbing Youth Restiveness In Niger Delta
Youth and restiveness are two words that have gained notoriety in the Nigerian context, especially in the Niger Delta region. With its oil resources which account for about 70 percent of the nation’s revenue, the Niger Delta region has become more or less the soul of Nigerian economy. Then, the question is “why youth restiveness in this region?
The word “youth”, according to Advanced Learners’ Dictionary, is defined as “when a person is still a child, especially the time before a child becomes an adult.” This may connote looking at the age bracket between eighteen and thirty five years. On the other hand, restive means “unable to be still or quiet, difficult to control, especially when one is not satisfied with something.”
The above definition of youth shows that youths have natural endowment of raw energy. They are always bubbling in spirit, with high hopes, big dreams, aspiration and ideas of what their future will be. To achieve this therefore they must not naturally be still or remain quiet, especially when their anticipation or future is heading towards the unexpected. They have to work if the basic needs of life must be met. Therefore, in this context, they have to be restive to an acceptable limit in order to lay a solid foundation for their future.
Permit me to identify and group restive youths into four categories. The first is the group that is geared towards genuine agitation for the rights and restoration of dignity to the Niger Delta . Example of this was the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) led by Late Ken Saro-Wiwa. The late social critic and other eight Ogoni sons were murdered by the late Sani Abacha’s government for agitating for the rights of the Ogoni people. We also have the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) in this group.
The second group is made up of youths who engage in self-seeking and criminal activities such as oil-bunkering, armed robbery and other heinous crimes. They are also being used as political thugs by politicians from this region to intimidate political opponents and to rig elections.
The third group comprises of youths who engage in supremacy contest among one another, in a bid to gain government’s recognition and attention. The supremacy contest between the group led by Asari Dokubo and another one by Ateke Tom for some years now is a clear example. Their activities in the Niger Delta have claimed many lives, as well as forestalling economic activities in the Niger Delta region.
The last group is made up of youths who are on a revenge mission for being used and dumped by politicians after getting to power.
Given the bad image the activities of the last three groups have, and are still causing the Niger Delta, there is an urgent need for solution.
Besides concentrating energies on how to retrieve the guns from some of these groups that have taken hostage-taking and a host of other vices as means of livelihood, the government at all levels should be sincere in the development of the Niger Delta region which produces about 70 per cent of the nation’s revenue.
For example, top priority attention should be given to education in terms of budget. If not up to university level, at least primary and secondary education should be made free to reduce the number of school drop-outs who, for lack of better things to do, join restive groups.
Meanwhile, government and the oil and gas companies operating in the region should provide employment for the youths of this region. The oil and gas companies should always respect the (MOU) agreement they entered into with their host communities to avoid unnecessary clashes with the youth bodies.
In addition, anti-corruption agency should double its efforts in fighting cases of corruption in the Niger Delta.
If these and many other suggestions are carried out by the Federal, State and Local Government, and oil companies operating in the Niger Delta, the issue of youth restiveness will be a thing of the past.
Enyina wrote in from Port Harcourt.
From all indications, Nigeria possesses enough human and material resources to become a true economic powerhouse in Africa. According to the National Population Commission (NPC, 2023), the country’s population has grown steadily within the last decade, presently standing at about 220 million people—mostly young, vibrant, and innovative. Nigeria also remains the sixth-largest oil producer in the world, with enormous reserves of gas, fertile agricultural land, and human capital.
Yet, despite this enormous potential, the country continues to grapple with underdevelopment, poverty, unemployment, and insecurity. Recent data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2023) show that about 129 million Nigerians currently live below the poverty line. Most families can no longer afford basic necessities, even as the government continues to project a rosy economic picture.
The Subsidy Question
The removal of fuel subsidy in 2023 by President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has been one of the most controversial policy decisions in Nigeria’s recent history. According to the president, subsidy removal was designed to reduce fiscal burden, unify the foreign exchange rate, attract investment, curb inflation, and discourage excessive government borrowing.
While these objectives are theoretically sound, the reality for ordinary Nigerians has been severe hardship. Fuel prices more than tripled, transportation costs surged, and food inflation—already high—rose above 30% (NBS, 2023). The World Bank (2023) estimates that an additional 7.1 million Nigerians were pushed into poverty after subsidy removal.
A Critical Economic View
As an economist, I argue that the problem was not subsidy removal itself—which was inevitable—but the timing, sequencing, and structural gaps in Nigeria’s implementation.
- Structural Miscalculation
Nigeria’s four state-owned refineries remain nonfunctional. By removing subsidies without local refining capacity, the government exposed the economy to import-price pass-through effects—where global oil price shocks translate directly into domestic inflation. This was not just a timing issue but a fundamental policy miscalculation.
- Neglect of Social Safety Nets
Countries like Indonesia (2005) and Ghana (2005) removed subsidies successfully only after introducing cash transfers, transport vouchers, and food subsidies for the poor (World Bank, 2005). Nigeria, however, implemented removal abruptly, shifting the fiscal burden directly onto households without protection.
- Failure to Secure Food and Energy Alternatives
Fuel subsidy removal amplified existing weaknesses in agriculture and energy. Instead of sequencing reforms, government left Nigerians without refinery capacity, renewable energy alternatives, or mechanized agricultural productivity—all of which could have cushioned the shock.
Political and Public Concerns
Prominent leaders have echoed these concerns. Mr. Peter Obi, the Labour Party’s 2023 presidential candidate, described the subsidy removal as “good but wrongly timed.” Atiku Abubakar of the People’s Democratic Party also faulted the government’s hasty approach. Human rights activists like Obodoekwe Stive stressed that refineries should have been made functional first, to reduce the suffering of citizens.
This is not just political rhetoric—it reflects a widespread economic reality. When inflation climbs above 30%, when purchasing power collapses, and when households cannot meet basic needs, the promise of reform becomes overshadowed by social pain.
Broader Implications
The consequences of this policy are multidimensional:
- Inflationary Pressures – Food inflation above 30% has made nutrition unaffordable for many households.
- Rising Poverty – 7.1 million Nigerians have been newly pushed into poverty (World Bank, 2023).
- Middle-Class Erosion – Rising transport, rent, and healthcare costs are squeezing household incomes.
- Debt Concerns – Despite promises, government borrowing has continued, raising sustainability questions.
- Public Distrust – When government promises savings but citizens feel only pain, trust in leadership erodes.
In effect, subsidy removal without structural readiness has widened inequality and eroded social stability.
Missed Opportunities
Nigeria’s leaders had the chance to approach subsidy removal differently:
- Refinery Rehabilitation – Ensuring local refining to reduce exposure to global oil price shocks.
- Renewable Energy Investment – Diversifying energy through solar, hydro, and wind to reduce reliance on imported petroleum.
- Agricultural Productivity – Mechanization, irrigation, and smallholder financing could have boosted food supply and stabilized prices.
- Social Safety Nets – Conditional cash transfers, food vouchers, and transport subsidies could have protected the most vulnerable.
Instead, reform came abruptly, leaving citizens to absorb all the pain while waiting for theoretical long-term benefits.
Conclusion: Reform With a Human Face
Fuel subsidy removal was inevitable, but Nigeria’s approach has worsened hardship for millions. True reform must go beyond fiscal savings to protect citizens.
Economic policy is not judged only by its efficiency but by its humanity. A well-sequenced reform could have balanced fiscal responsibility with equity, ensuring that ordinary Nigerians were not crushed under the weight of sudden change.
Nigeria has the resources, population, and resilience to lead Africa’s economy. But leadership requires foresight. It requires policies that are inclusive, humane, and strategically sequenced.
Reform without equity is displacement of poverty, not development. If Nigeria truly seeks progress, its policies must wear a human face.
References
- National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). (2023). Poverty and Inequality Report. Abuja.
- National Population Commission (NPC). (2023). Population Estimates. Abuja.
- World Bank. (2023). Nigeria Development Update. Washington, DC.
- World Bank. (2005). Fuel Subsidy Reforms: Lessons from Indonesia and Ghana. Washington, DC.
- OPEC. (2023). Annual Statistical Bulletin. Vienna.
By: Amarachi Amaugo