Editorial
Shehu Aliyu Shagari (1925 – 2018)
Unarguably the last of the titans, Shehu Aliyu Shagari, Second Republic President of Nigeria, went the way of all mortals on December 28, 2018, marking the end of an eventful era in the annals of the nation’s political metamorphosis.
A nationalist, patriot and statesman, Shagari was, until his demise, one of the few solons that did not only dominate his native Northern Nigerian space with mercurial audacity, but also, like his contemporaries, bestrode the nation’s political landscape like a magnificent colossus.
Small wonder then that the series of obviously unhealthy political developments in the country before and after his (Shagari’s) transition have hardly dimmed the avalanche of encomiums that has continued to flow freely like torrents. Tributes after tributes from Nigeria’s elites, including President Muhammadu Buhari who ousted his government, had underlined his sterling qualities of honesty and politics without bitterness which they themselves have failed to imbibe.
Although Nigeria’s political culture had always seem to function around ostentation and wider expectations, Shagari can be excused for whatever shortcomings, having presided over the nation at a period when our optimism about what was possible far outstripped our capacities to build and to persevere.
The Tide is not saying that Shagari was a saint among sinners. Not at all. But he can be singled out as one of those supranational symbols whose invocation had often sufficed to heal divisive acrimonies in the land and douse the unending embers of sectarian and clannish obsessions. It is to his eternal credit that he preached national unity and progress till his death.
Willed into existence on February 25, 1925, Shagari started his education in a Quaranic school and later attended Yabo Elementary School (1931-1935). After attending middle school in Sokoto from 1936 and 1940, he attended Kaduna College from 1941 – 1944 from where he gained admission into Teachers Training College, Zaria in 1944. He was a visiting teacher in Sokoto Province in 1953 and also a member of the Federal Scholarship Board between 1954 and 1958.
After his public service stint, Shagari was appointed Secretary of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) in Sokoto from where he was elected into his first public office as a member of the House of Representatives for Sokoto West in 1954.
In 1958, the then Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa appointed Shagari his Parliamentary Secretary and later Federal Minister for Commerce and Industry. He was at various times Federal Minister of Economic Development (1959 – 1960), Federal Minister of Pensions (1960 – 1962), Federal Minister of Works (1965 – 1966), Secretary, Sokoto Province Education Development Fund, Commissioner for Establishment in the North Western State.
In 1970, Shagari staged a come back to the Federal Cabinet first as Commissioner for Economic Development, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, and later as Federal Commissioner for Finance from 1971 to 1975. During this period, he was a governor of World Bank and a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Committee of Twenty.
A co-founder of the defunct National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in 1978, Shagari was elected Nigeria’s first executive President on the party’s platform in 1979 in a keenly contested but controversial election that involved Chief Obafemi Awolowo (Unity Party of Nigeria), Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe (Nigeria Peoples Party), Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim (Great Nigeria Peoples Party) and Alhaji Aminu Kano (People’s Redemption Party).
Upon assuming duties on October 1, 1979, Shagari pledged to promote agricultural and economic development and help prosecute the fight against racism in Southern Africa.
In 1980, he initiated the Green Revolution, a comprehensive agricultural programme to ensure self-sufficiency in food production. He set up among others, 11 river basin development authorities to actualise it. Between 1980 and 1983, he completed the Kaduna Refinery, the Delta Steel complex and the Aluminum Smelter Company at Ikot Abasi.
Basking in the euphoria of the oil boom, Shagari also gave housing, transportation and industries a major boost in his administration’s policy.
A proponent of the African Defence Force in the 1980 Summit of the defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Shagari’s foreign policy was hinged on the liquidation of the white minority rule in South Africa and the independence of Namibia.
Unfortunately, Shagari’s second term in 1983 was terminated by Major General (now, President) Muhammadu Buhari in a military putsch over allegations of corruption.
Yet, his ordeal in Buhari’s hand did not blight his vision for a greater and united Nigeria as he continued to contribute to national discourse, even with his frail health, and until his eventual passage. His, was indeed a life of meritorious service to the nation.
The Turaki of Sokoto since 1962, Shagari was a recipient of several chieftaincy titles of several communities across Nigeria and also a Grand Commander of the Order of the Federal Republic (GCFR), the country’s highest national honour.
May his soul rest in perfect peace.
Editorial
Benue Killings: Beyond Tinubu’s Visit

The recent massacre in Yelewata, Benue State, ranks among Nigeria’s deadliest attacks of
2025. While official figures put the death toll at 59, media reports and Amnesty International estimate between 100 and 200 fatalities. This atrocity extends a decade-long pattern of violence in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, where Beacon Security data records 1,043 deaths in Benue alone between May 2023 and May 2025.
President Tinubu’s visit on 18 June—four days after the 14 June attack—has drawn sharp criticism for its lateness. This delay echoes a history of inadequate responses, with Human Rights Watch documenting similar inaction in Plateau and Kaduna states since 2013, fuelling a culture of impunity. The attack lasted over two hours without meaningful security intervention, despite claims of swift action.
The violence bore hallmarks of genocide, with survivors recounting systematic house burnings and executions. More than 2.2 million people have been displaced in the region since 2019 due to comparable attacks. Data show Benue’s agricultural output falls by 0.21 per cent in crops and 0.31 per cent in livestock for every 1 per cent rise in violence.
Security forces continue to underperform. No arrests were made following the Easter attacks in April (56 killed) or May’s Gwer West massacre (42 killed). During his visit, Tinubu questioned publicly why no suspects had been detained four days after Yelewata, highlighting entrenched accountability failures.
The roots of the conflict are complex, with climate change pushing northern herders south and 77 per cent of Benue’s population reliant on agriculture. A Tiv community leader described the violence as “calculated land-grabbing” rather than mere clashes, with over 500 deaths recorded since 2019.
Government interventions have largely fallen short. The 2018 federal task force and 2025 Forest Guards initiative failed to curb violence. Tinubu’s newly announced committee of ex-governors and traditional rulers has been met with scepticism given the litany of past unkept promises.
The economic fallout is severe. Benue’s status as Nigeria’s “food basket” is crumbling as farms are destroyed and farmers displaced. This worsens the nation’s food crisis, with hunger surges in 2023-2024 directly linked to farming disruptions caused by insecurity.
Citizens demanding justice have been met with force; protesters faced police tear gas, and the State Assembly conceded total failure in safeguarding lives, admitting that the governor, deputy, and 32 lawmakers had all neglected their constitutional responsibilities.
The massacre has drawn international condemnation. Pope Leo XIV decried the “terrible massacre,” while the UN called for an investigation. The hashtag “200 Nigerians” trended worldwide on X, with many contrasting Nigeria’s slow response to India’s swift action following a plane crash with similar fatalities.
Nigeria’s centralised security system is clearly overwhelmed. A single police force is tasked with covering 36 states and 774 local government areas for a population exceeding 200 million. Between 2021 and 2023 alone, 29,828 killings and 15,404 kidnappings were recorded nationally. Proposals for state police, floated since January 2025, remain stalled.
Other populous nations offer alternative models. Canada’s provincial police, India’s state forces, and Indonesia’s municipal units demonstrate the effectiveness of decentralised policing. Nigeria’s centralised structure creates intelligence and response gaps, worsened by the distance—both physical and bureaucratic—from Abuja to affected communities.
The immediate aftermath is dire: 21 IDP camps in Benue are overwhelmed, and a humanitarian crisis is deepening. The State Assembly declared three days of mourning (18-20 June), but survivors lack sufficient medical aid. Tragically, many of those killed were already displaced by earlier violence.
A lasting solution requires a multi-pronged approach, including targeted security deployment, regulated grazing land, and full enforcement of Benue’s 2017 Anti-Open Grazing Law. The National Economic Council’s failure to prioritise state police in May 2025 represents a missed chance for reform.
Without decisive intervention, trends suggest conditions will worsen. More than 20,000 Nigerians have been killed and 13,000 kidnapped nationwide in 2025 alone. As Governor Hyacinth Alia stressed during Tinubu’s visit, state police may be the only viable path forward. All 36 states have submitted proposals supporting decentralisation—a crucial step towards breaking Nigeria’s vicious cycle of violence.
Editorial
Responding To Herders’ Threat In Rivers

Editorial
Democracy Day: So Far…

Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999 marked a watershed moment in the nation’s political history. After enduring nearly 16 years of successive military dictatorships, Nigerians embraced a new era of civil governance with the inauguration of President Olusegun Obasanjo on May 29, 1999. Since then, the country has sustained a democratic system for 26 years. But, this democratic journey has been a complex mix of progress and persistent challenges.
The formal recognition of June 12 as Democracy Day in 2018 by former President Muhammadu Buhari acknowledged a long-standing injustice. The annulment of the 1993 presidential election, Nigeria’s freest, betrayed the democratic aspirations of millions. That it took decades to honour this date reflects the nation’s complex relationship with its democratic memory.
One of the most momentous successes of Nigeria’s democracy has been the uninterrupted civilian rule over the last two and a half decades. The country has witnessed seven general elections, with power transferring peacefully among different political parties. This is particularly notable considering that prior to 1999, no civilian government had completed a full term without military intervention. The peaceful transitions in 2007, 2015, and 2023 are testaments to Nigeria’s evolving democratic maturity.
Electoral participation, while uneven, has also reflected a level of democratic engagement. In 2003, voter turnout stood at about 69 per cent, but this figure dropped to approximately 34.75 per cent in 2023, according to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Although the declining turnout raises concerns, it also highlights the increasing expectations of the electorate, who demand credible and transparent elections.
Another area of progress is the growth of a vibrant and free press. Nigerian media has played a crucial role in holding governments accountable and fostering public discourse. Investigative journalism and civil society activism have exposed corruption and human rights abuses. The rise of social media has further expanded the democratic space, enabling young Nigerians to mobilise and advocate for change, as evidenced by the 2020 #EndSARS protests.
Judicial independence has seen mixed results. On one hand, the judiciary has occasionally demonstrated resilience, such as in landmark rulings that overturned fraudulent elections or curtailed executive excesses. On the other hand, allegations of political interference and corruption within the judiciary persist, undermining public confidence in the legal system’s impartiality.
Nigeria’s democracy has also facilitated the decentralisation of power through the federal system. State governments now wield some autonomy, allowing for experimentation in governance and service delivery. While this has led to innovative policies in some states, it has also entrenched patronage networks and uneven development across the federation.
Despite these successes, Nigeria’s democratic journey faces formidable problems. Electoral integrity remains a critical concern. Reports from election observers, including those from the European Union and ECOWAS, frequently highlight issues such as vote-buying, ballot box snatching, and violence. The introduction of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and electronic transmission of results in 2023 elections showed promise, but technical glitches and alleged manipulations dampened public trust.
Corruption continues to be a pervasive issue. Nigeria ranks 145th out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index, with a score of 25/100. Democratic institutions meant to check graft—such as anti-corruption agencies and the legislature—often struggle due to political interference and weak enforcement mechanisms.
Security challenges have also strained Nigeria’s democracy. Insurgency in the North East, banditry in the North West, separatist agitations in the South East, and herder-farmer conflicts across the Middle Belt have collectively resulted in thousands of deaths and displacements. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2024, Nigeria ranks as the eighth most impacted country by terrorism. The government’s difficulty in ensuring safety erodes public confidence in the state’s capacity and legitimacy.
The economy poses another critical remonstrance. Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita stands at approximately $2,400 as of 2024, with over 40 per cent of the population living below the national poverty line. High unemployment and inflation have fueled discontent and disillusionment with democratic governance, especially among youth. Without addressing economic grievances, the democratic dividend will remain elusive for many Nigerians.
Ethnic and religious divisions further complicate Nigeria’s democratic consolidation. Politicians often exploit identity politics for electoral gains, exacerbating social tensions. Although federal character principles aim to promote inclusiveness, they have also sometimes fostered a quota mentality rather than merit-based appointments.
Gender representation remains inadequate in Nigeria’s democratic institutions. Women occupy less than 10 per cent of seats in the National Assembly, one of the lowest rates globally. Efforts to pass gender parity bills have faced stiff resistance, highlighting deep-seated cultural and institutional barriers to female political participation.
Civil liberties, while constitutionally guaranteed, are under threat. Crackdowns on protesters, restrictions on press freedom, and surveillance of activists reveal an authoritarian streak within the democratic framework. The controversial Twitter ban in 2021 exemplified the country’s willingness to curb digital freedoms, prompting domestic and international criticism.
The political crisis in Rivers State embodies broader democratic struggles. Attempts to control the state through undemocratic means expose weaknesses in federal institutions and the rule of law. Immediate restoration of democratic governance in Rivers State is vital to preserving Nigeria’s democratic integrity and institutional credibility.
Local governments remain under the control of state governors, depriving citizens of grassroots democracy. Last year’s Supreme Court judgment on local government autonomy is promising, but state-level resistance threatens its implementation. Genuine autonomy would bring governance closer to the people and foster democratic innovation.
As we mark Democracy Day, we must honour the sacrifices of Chief M.K.O. Abiola, Kudirat Abiola, Femi Falana, Chief Gani Fawehinmi, Pa Alfred Rewane, President Bola Tinubu, and countless others, who fought for Nigeria’s freedom. As democracy in Nigeria continues to evolve after 26 years, this day should inspire action toward its renewal. With despotism and state failure as real threats, both citizens and leaders must take responsibility—citizens by demanding more, and leaders by delivering. Excuses are no longer acceptable.