Editorial
Another Look At PIB Provisions

Progress on the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) currently under careful considerations in the National
Assembly (NASS) may be stalled as two prominent groups in the Niger Delta region, the Pan-Niger Delta Forum (PANDEF) and the Niger Delta Dialogue (NDD), have outrightly rejected no fewer than 12 significant provisions in the Petroleum Host and Impacted Communities Development Bill (PHICDB).
Specifically, both groups are asking for the redrafting, rephrasing and restructuring of the observed provisions to accommodate the interests of the poor and neglected people of the oil and gas host and impacted communities in the Niger Delta or lose the peace and development sought by the PHICDB in the region.
PANDEF and NDD revealed their positions during the NDD’s Strategic Communication and Advocacy Training session for major stakeholders in PANDEF, NDD, and the various Policy Advocacy Committees (PACs) in Port Harcourt recently. The PHICDB is an essential part of the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) currently before both chambers of the National Assembly.
The PHICDB seeks to promote sustainable mutual social and economic benefits from petroleum operations to host and impacted communities. It is equally designed to enhance peaceful and harmonious coexistence between settlers and host/impacted communities as well as create a framework to support their development process.
The objectionable provisions include the Interpretations Section, which the groups claim was vague in the use of words and terms such as “host and impacted communities” to describe oil-bearing communities in the region. They also faulted the silence of the bill on how the clusters should be formed and the trust fund shared. Similarly, they rejected the vague use of the term ‘Settlor(s)’ in Part 2, Section 2, Subsection 1 and 2 of the draft bill.
Additionally, the stakeholders wondered why “sabotage spill” was not clearly defined but its effects were highlighted in the draft bill. Further, they condemned the observed silence in the sharing formula of the accruing fund from the “Settlor(s)” between host and impacted communities, particularly given that there are more impacted settlements than host communities in available oil industry records.
Furthermore, the groups took a swipe at Part 3, Section 9, Subsection 1 and 2 of the draft bill for resting the creation and determination of the membership of the Board of Trustees (BoTs) for the trust funds on the International Oil Companies (IOCs). They also picked holes in Section 11, which splits the utilisation of the Endowment Fund to 70 per cent for capital expenditure; 20 per cent for the Reserve Fund; and 10 per cent for the settlor(s) special projects.
Expressing worry that the Presidency failed to specify how the operating expenditures of the settlor(s) would be verified to ascertain the accruing funds to the cluster trusts, the stakeholders objected to Section 22 that the settlors’ Operating Expenditure (OPEX) paid into the trust fund shall be subject to Petroleum Income Tax (PIT) and Companies Income Tax (CIT) deductibles.
Section 5 of the bill was queried for failing to give specific sanctions for underpayment, late payment or non-payment of agreed money into the cluster trust fund as and when due. They lamented the insufficient clarity on time frames for the incorporation of cluster trusts for host and impacted communities and the failure to stipulate penalties for reneging on implementation of agreed projects and programmes by the settlor(s) as contained in Section 3 of the bill.
First, it must be established that the broad objectives of the PHICDB are commendable, and that is to find an acceptable framework for an active company-community engagement mechanism structure. But it shouldn’t be seen as a substitute for the government’s responsibility to provide basic services and infrastructure for the host and impacted communities.
However, the flawed provisions identified by PANDEF and NDD are troubling. These principally relate to the power vested in the oil industry to determine crucial parameters connected to how funding will be allocated. We also need to know what constitutes a host community and how the BoTs to manage the funds will be set up.
If the purported purpose of the bill is to empower host communities to take charge of their development needs, why does it give the IOCs the sole power to appoint and determine the composition of the BoT, cutting communities out of the decision-making process? This way, investors can appoint non-indigenous persons as board members. This is a source of conflict and highly undesirable for a bill that aims to build trust.
Again, the issues regarding the lack of an enforceable time frame for project implementation must not be ignored because of its likely consequences. It will probably institutionalise the perception among communities that their concerns are marginal to those of industry, hence, generate serious grievance for many.
It is equally sad that the PHICDB makes settlors the sole authority for determining areas of operation. In effect, this is the power to determine which communities are impacted by the petroleum industry and as such benefit from the trust fund. This means communities that suffer environmental damage from the petroleum industry, but which, if not designated as a host community, will be denied compensations. This enables IOCs to fulfill their obligations in a way that suits their needs, not the communities’.
The PHICDB, as it stands, downplays the role of government in the development of host communities. Instead, it places that responsibility on the oil companies, with the only role for the government that of the Nigerian Petroleum Regulatory Commission (NPRC). NPRC is to mediate in disputes with the proviso that the decision of the Commission remains valid until overturned by the Federal High Court.
But being a creation of the government, it is believed that the NPRC may not be an impartial arbiter because the likely outcome in any such dispute will be favourable to industry, not the communities. And since historical antecedents of such litigations in court have tended to take years, if they are resolved at all, likely the NPRC decision will unduly last longer.
Clearly, the PHICDB vests too much power in the IOCs, particularly in terms of deciding how development projects are determined and implemented, as well as their beneficiaries. This may further alienate communities that already consider themselves cut out of decision-making. In consequence, the Federal Government and NASS should re-examine the PIB and accommodate the recommendations of the PACs to prevent another round of tension and agitations in the region.
Editorial
Benue Killings: Beyond Tinubu’s Visit

The recent massacre in Yelewata, Benue State, ranks among Nigeria’s deadliest attacks of
2025. While official figures put the death toll at 59, media reports and Amnesty International estimate between 100 and 200 fatalities. This atrocity extends a decade-long pattern of violence in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, where Beacon Security data records 1,043 deaths in Benue alone between May 2023 and May 2025.
President Tinubu’s visit on 18 June—four days after the 14 June attack—has drawn sharp criticism for its lateness. This delay echoes a history of inadequate responses, with Human Rights Watch documenting similar inaction in Plateau and Kaduna states since 2013, fuelling a culture of impunity. The attack lasted over two hours without meaningful security intervention, despite claims of swift action.
The violence bore hallmarks of genocide, with survivors recounting systematic house burnings and executions. More than 2.2 million people have been displaced in the region since 2019 due to comparable attacks. Data show Benue’s agricultural output falls by 0.21 per cent in crops and 0.31 per cent in livestock for every 1 per cent rise in violence.
Security forces continue to underperform. No arrests were made following the Easter attacks in April (56 killed) or May’s Gwer West massacre (42 killed). During his visit, Tinubu questioned publicly why no suspects had been detained four days after Yelewata, highlighting entrenched accountability failures.
The roots of the conflict are complex, with climate change pushing northern herders south and 77 per cent of Benue’s population reliant on agriculture. A Tiv community leader described the violence as “calculated land-grabbing” rather than mere clashes, with over 500 deaths recorded since 2019.
Government interventions have largely fallen short. The 2018 federal task force and 2025 Forest Guards initiative failed to curb violence. Tinubu’s newly announced committee of ex-governors and traditional rulers has been met with scepticism given the litany of past unkept promises.
The economic fallout is severe. Benue’s status as Nigeria’s “food basket” is crumbling as farms are destroyed and farmers displaced. This worsens the nation’s food crisis, with hunger surges in 2023-2024 directly linked to farming disruptions caused by insecurity.
Citizens demanding justice have been met with force; protesters faced police tear gas, and the State Assembly conceded total failure in safeguarding lives, admitting that the governor, deputy, and 32 lawmakers had all neglected their constitutional responsibilities.
The massacre has drawn international condemnation. Pope Leo XIV decried the “terrible massacre,” while the UN called for an investigation. The hashtag “200 Nigerians” trended worldwide on X, with many contrasting Nigeria’s slow response to India’s swift action following a plane crash with similar fatalities.
Nigeria’s centralised security system is clearly overwhelmed. A single police force is tasked with covering 36 states and 774 local government areas for a population exceeding 200 million. Between 2021 and 2023 alone, 29,828 killings and 15,404 kidnappings were recorded nationally. Proposals for state police, floated since January 2025, remain stalled.
Other populous nations offer alternative models. Canada’s provincial police, India’s state forces, and Indonesia’s municipal units demonstrate the effectiveness of decentralised policing. Nigeria’s centralised structure creates intelligence and response gaps, worsened by the distance—both physical and bureaucratic—from Abuja to affected communities.
The immediate aftermath is dire: 21 IDP camps in Benue are overwhelmed, and a humanitarian crisis is deepening. The State Assembly declared three days of mourning (18-20 June), but survivors lack sufficient medical aid. Tragically, many of those killed were already displaced by earlier violence.
A lasting solution requires a multi-pronged approach, including targeted security deployment, regulated grazing land, and full enforcement of Benue’s 2017 Anti-Open Grazing Law. The National Economic Council’s failure to prioritise state police in May 2025 represents a missed chance for reform.
Without decisive intervention, trends suggest conditions will worsen. More than 20,000 Nigerians have been killed and 13,000 kidnapped nationwide in 2025 alone. As Governor Hyacinth Alia stressed during Tinubu’s visit, state police may be the only viable path forward. All 36 states have submitted proposals supporting decentralisation—a crucial step towards breaking Nigeria’s vicious cycle of violence.
Editorial
Responding To Herders’ Threat In Rivers

Editorial
Democracy Day: So Far…

Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999 marked a watershed moment in the nation’s political history. After enduring nearly 16 years of successive military dictatorships, Nigerians embraced a new era of civil governance with the inauguration of President Olusegun Obasanjo on May 29, 1999. Since then, the country has sustained a democratic system for 26 years. But, this democratic journey has been a complex mix of progress and persistent challenges.
The formal recognition of June 12 as Democracy Day in 2018 by former President Muhammadu Buhari acknowledged a long-standing injustice. The annulment of the 1993 presidential election, Nigeria’s freest, betrayed the democratic aspirations of millions. That it took decades to honour this date reflects the nation’s complex relationship with its democratic memory.
One of the most momentous successes of Nigeria’s democracy has been the uninterrupted civilian rule over the last two and a half decades. The country has witnessed seven general elections, with power transferring peacefully among different political parties. This is particularly notable considering that prior to 1999, no civilian government had completed a full term without military intervention. The peaceful transitions in 2007, 2015, and 2023 are testaments to Nigeria’s evolving democratic maturity.
Electoral participation, while uneven, has also reflected a level of democratic engagement. In 2003, voter turnout stood at about 69 per cent, but this figure dropped to approximately 34.75 per cent in 2023, according to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Although the declining turnout raises concerns, it also highlights the increasing expectations of the electorate, who demand credible and transparent elections.
Another area of progress is the growth of a vibrant and free press. Nigerian media has played a crucial role in holding governments accountable and fostering public discourse. Investigative journalism and civil society activism have exposed corruption and human rights abuses. The rise of social media has further expanded the democratic space, enabling young Nigerians to mobilise and advocate for change, as evidenced by the 2020 #EndSARS protests.
Judicial independence has seen mixed results. On one hand, the judiciary has occasionally demonstrated resilience, such as in landmark rulings that overturned fraudulent elections or curtailed executive excesses. On the other hand, allegations of political interference and corruption within the judiciary persist, undermining public confidence in the legal system’s impartiality.
Nigeria’s democracy has also facilitated the decentralisation of power through the federal system. State governments now wield some autonomy, allowing for experimentation in governance and service delivery. While this has led to innovative policies in some states, it has also entrenched patronage networks and uneven development across the federation.
Despite these successes, Nigeria’s democratic journey faces formidable problems. Electoral integrity remains a critical concern. Reports from election observers, including those from the European Union and ECOWAS, frequently highlight issues such as vote-buying, ballot box snatching, and violence. The introduction of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and electronic transmission of results in 2023 elections showed promise, but technical glitches and alleged manipulations dampened public trust.
Corruption continues to be a pervasive issue. Nigeria ranks 145th out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index, with a score of 25/100. Democratic institutions meant to check graft—such as anti-corruption agencies and the legislature—often struggle due to political interference and weak enforcement mechanisms.
Security challenges have also strained Nigeria’s democracy. Insurgency in the North East, banditry in the North West, separatist agitations in the South East, and herder-farmer conflicts across the Middle Belt have collectively resulted in thousands of deaths and displacements. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2024, Nigeria ranks as the eighth most impacted country by terrorism. The government’s difficulty in ensuring safety erodes public confidence in the state’s capacity and legitimacy.
The economy poses another critical remonstrance. Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita stands at approximately $2,400 as of 2024, with over 40 per cent of the population living below the national poverty line. High unemployment and inflation have fueled discontent and disillusionment with democratic governance, especially among youth. Without addressing economic grievances, the democratic dividend will remain elusive for many Nigerians.
Ethnic and religious divisions further complicate Nigeria’s democratic consolidation. Politicians often exploit identity politics for electoral gains, exacerbating social tensions. Although federal character principles aim to promote inclusiveness, they have also sometimes fostered a quota mentality rather than merit-based appointments.
Gender representation remains inadequate in Nigeria’s democratic institutions. Women occupy less than 10 per cent of seats in the National Assembly, one of the lowest rates globally. Efforts to pass gender parity bills have faced stiff resistance, highlighting deep-seated cultural and institutional barriers to female political participation.
Civil liberties, while constitutionally guaranteed, are under threat. Crackdowns on protesters, restrictions on press freedom, and surveillance of activists reveal an authoritarian streak within the democratic framework. The controversial Twitter ban in 2021 exemplified the country’s willingness to curb digital freedoms, prompting domestic and international criticism.
The political crisis in Rivers State embodies broader democratic struggles. Attempts to control the state through undemocratic means expose weaknesses in federal institutions and the rule of law. Immediate restoration of democratic governance in Rivers State is vital to preserving Nigeria’s democratic integrity and institutional credibility.
Local governments remain under the control of state governors, depriving citizens of grassroots democracy. Last year’s Supreme Court judgment on local government autonomy is promising, but state-level resistance threatens its implementation. Genuine autonomy would bring governance closer to the people and foster democratic innovation.
As we mark Democracy Day, we must honour the sacrifices of Chief M.K.O. Abiola, Kudirat Abiola, Femi Falana, Chief Gani Fawehinmi, Pa Alfred Rewane, President Bola Tinubu, and countless others, who fought for Nigeria’s freedom. As democracy in Nigeria continues to evolve after 26 years, this day should inspire action toward its renewal. With despotism and state failure as real threats, both citizens and leaders must take responsibility—citizens by demanding more, and leaders by delivering. Excuses are no longer acceptable.
-
Editorial4 days ago
Benue Killings: Beyond Tinubu’s Visit
-
Business4 days ago
Nigeria’s Rural Poverty Hits 75% – World Bank
-
Sports4 days ago
CWC: Bad Blood As Inter Edge River Plate To Advance
-
Business4 days ago
NSC, Police Boost Partnership On Port Enforcement
-
Niger Delta4 days ago
ISOPLOT Has No Legitimacy to Speak for Isoko, INYA Warns
-
Politics4 days ago
10 NWC Members Oppose Damagum Over National Secretary’s Reinstatement
-
Opinion4 days ago
Benue Conflicts, Hope At Last?
-
Business4 days ago
NCDMB Charges Host Community Youths On Relevant Skills Development … As Promoters Handover Oloibiri Oil Museum