Editorial
The Coup In Mali
On August 18, a military junta led by 37-year-old new strongman, Colonel Assimi Goita, under the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (NCSP), toppled the democratically elected civilian government in Mali. While executing the coup, the Kati-based rebel commanders swooped on the nation’s capital, Bamako, and arrested its 75-year-old President, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita; his Prime Minister, Boubou Cisse; Army and Air Force chiefs; top ministers and a number of other government officials, after the president had failed to comply with their ultimatum to resign following weeks and months of protests over poor governance and lack of political will to crush belligerent Islamic insurgents.
About 24 hours after the mutiny, the president appeared on live national television to announce his resignation, saying he had no other choice, but to avoid “bloodshed”. But following pressure, the junta, last Thursday, released the president to return to his home with the security appropriate to his rank as a former head of state, as well as the possibility of having the doctor of his choice and of travelling abroad for medical checkups.
Spokesman for the junta, Ismael Wague, said, “We understand that heads of state, like Ivory Coast’s Alassane Ouattara, are working for an easing of tensions, for a peaceful solution, even if they have firmly condemned our seizing power. We are open to discussion (negotiations). A transitional council, with a transitional president who is going to be either military or civilian would be appointed. The transition will be the shortest possible.” The junta also promised that they would enact a political transition and stage elections within a “reasonable time” but has failed to spell out any details.
Speaking after Keita’s release, President Mahamadou Issoufou Keita of Niger, who currently chairs the ECOWAS, said, “If we consider that the question of (Keita’s) release is resolved, it is not the same concerning the return to constitutional order, which pre-supposes that all troops return to their barracks”. We agree with the Nigerien president completely. This is why we join the African Union, European Union, the United States and UN Security Council to condemn the coup and demand a “speedy, peaceful and democratic” resolution of the crisis, which we see as “dangerous for democracy in Africa.”
No doubt, the August 18 coup — the second in eight years — deals a deadly blow to Mali still struggling with a jihadist insurgency, moribund economy and deep public resentment over its government. We recall that the first putsch in 2012 was followed by an insurrection in the north which developed into a terrorists’ insurgency that now threatens neighbouring Niger, Burkina Faso, and extending to Nigeria, Chad and Cameroun. Thousands of UN and French troops, along with soldiers from five Sahel countries, have since been deployed to try to stem the bloodshed while a multinational military task force is also waging war against the Islamic State in West Africa Province and Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria’s North-East and elsewhere.
We further reckon that Keita had won election in a landslide in 2013, by putting himself forward as a unifying figure in a fractured country; and was re-elected in 2018 for another five-year term with a pledge to pursue economic recovery and prosperity, and annihilate Islamic jihadists. But he failed to show commitment to fight against the jihadist revolt that has left swathes of the country in the hands of armed bandits, which had ignited ethnic violence in most parts of the country. Consequently, thousands of people have died and hundreds of thousands have fled their homes, creating a horde of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and a humanitarian crisis. That devastation has also compounded the damage to an already fragile economy in a nation with large number of unemployed young people.
Obviously, the pent-up discontent dragged on till this year, and was exacerbated following the disputed outcome of last April’s legislative elections, which had created an anti-Keita protest coalition: “the June 5 Movement”, which had organised most of the anti-government protests, including August 28 rallies to “celebrate the victory of the Malian people.”
Addressing thousands of supporters, last Friday, a key player in the mass opposition protests and influential opposition figure in Mali, Mahmoud Dicko, told the new military rulers to ensure they kept to their words because they do not have “carte blanche” to govern the country.
“I have asked everyone to come together for Mali. I am still asking this, but that does not mean the military has a carte blanche. We will not give a blank cheque to anyone to run this country, that’s over… a radical change of governance is needed. We led the fight. People have died and the soldiers who have completed (this fight) must keep their word”, to return Mali to civil rule as soon as possible, he said.
While we agree with the majority views of Malians that change in government is needed to restore the dignity and prosperity of the country, we, however, believe that this sordid development is disturbing and creates an unnecessary distraction for leaders in Africa and around the world.
We support ECOWAS call for an interim government, “headed by a civilian or retired military officer, to last for six or nine months, and maximum of 12 calendar months”. We also agree with the 15-nation ECOWAS sanctions on Mali, including the closure of borders and ban on trade and financial flows. We support the sustenance of international pressure to restore order, and the United States Government’s suspension of military aid to Mali, with no further training or support of the country’s armed forces. We insist that the diplomatic and economic pressure be maintained to compel the junta to retrace their steps, and expedite action to return the beleaguered nation to democratic governance.
We, therefore, urge ECOWAS chief envoy and former president, Dr Goodluck Jonathan, and his team, to accept the military junta’s commitment, last Monday, to a 12-month transitional government to be run by a civilian team. ECOWAS negotiators must ensure that the military leaders work with their civilian counterparts, including the Constitutional Court “to ensure the immediate return of constitutional order” and acceptable timetable for fresh elections. We agree with Jonathan, Dicko and other stakeholders that the only plausible option going forward is the return to civilian rule. This is why we urge the military leaders to respect their calling and return to the barracks, while allowing civilians, dedicated to democratic ethos, run the government and bring the dividends of democracy to Malians. They should not be tempted to interfere in democratic governance in future, but allow politicians disagree to agree, because it is the nature of man.
The recent massacre in Yelewata, Benue State, ranks among Nigeria’s deadliest attacks of
2025. While official figures put the death toll at 59, media reports and Amnesty International estimate between 100 and 200 fatalities. This atrocity extends a decade-long pattern of violence in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, where Beacon Security data records 1,043 deaths in Benue alone between May 2023 and May 2025.
President Tinubu’s visit on 18 June—four days after the 14 June attack—has drawn sharp criticism for its lateness. This delay echoes a history of inadequate responses, with Human Rights Watch documenting similar inaction in Plateau and Kaduna states since 2013, fuelling a culture of impunity. The attack lasted over two hours without meaningful security intervention, despite claims of swift action.
The violence bore hallmarks of genocide, with survivors recounting systematic house burnings and executions. More than 2.2 million people have been displaced in the region since 2019 due to comparable attacks. Data show Benue’s agricultural output falls by 0.21 per cent in crops and 0.31 per cent in livestock for every 1 per cent rise in violence.
Security forces continue to underperform. No arrests were made following the Easter attacks in April (56 killed) or May’s Gwer West massacre (42 killed). During his visit, Tinubu questioned publicly why no suspects had been detained four days after Yelewata, highlighting entrenched accountability failures.
The roots of the conflict are complex, with climate change pushing northern herders south and 77 per cent of Benue’s population reliant on agriculture. A Tiv community leader described the violence as “calculated land-grabbing” rather than mere clashes, with over 500 deaths recorded since 2019.
Government interventions have largely fallen short. The 2018 federal task force and 2025 Forest Guards initiative failed to curb violence. Tinubu’s newly announced committee of ex-governors and traditional rulers has been met with scepticism given the litany of past unkept promises.
The economic fallout is severe. Benue’s status as Nigeria’s “food basket” is crumbling as farms are destroyed and farmers displaced. This worsens the nation’s food crisis, with hunger surges in 2023-2024 directly linked to farming disruptions caused by insecurity.
Citizens demanding justice have been met with force; protesters faced police tear gas, and the State Assembly conceded total failure in safeguarding lives, admitting that the governor, deputy, and 32 lawmakers had all neglected their constitutional responsibilities.
The massacre has drawn international condemnation. Pope Leo XIV decried the “terrible massacre,” while the UN called for an investigation. The hashtag “200 Nigerians” trended worldwide on X, with many contrasting Nigeria’s slow response to India’s swift action following a plane crash with similar fatalities.
Nigeria’s centralised security system is clearly overwhelmed. A single police force is tasked with covering 36 states and 774 local government areas for a population exceeding 200 million. Between 2021 and 2023 alone, 29,828 killings and 15,404 kidnappings were recorded nationally. Proposals for state police, floated since January 2025, remain stalled.
Other populous nations offer alternative models. Canada’s provincial police, India’s state forces, and Indonesia’s municipal units demonstrate the effectiveness of decentralised policing. Nigeria’s centralised structure creates intelligence and response gaps, worsened by the distance—both physical and bureaucratic—from Abuja to affected communities.
The immediate aftermath is dire: 21 IDP camps in Benue are overwhelmed, and a humanitarian crisis is deepening. The State Assembly declared three days of mourning (18-20 June), but survivors lack sufficient medical aid. Tragically, many of those killed were already displaced by earlier violence.
A lasting solution requires a multi-pronged approach, including targeted security deployment, regulated grazing land, and full enforcement of Benue’s 2017 Anti-Open Grazing Law. The National Economic Council’s failure to prioritise state police in May 2025 represents a missed chance for reform.
Without decisive intervention, trends suggest conditions will worsen. More than 20,000 Nigerians have been killed and 13,000 kidnapped nationwide in 2025 alone. As Governor Hyacinth Alia stressed during Tinubu’s visit, state police may be the only viable path forward. All 36 states have submitted proposals supporting decentralisation—a crucial step towards breaking Nigeria’s vicious cycle of violence.
Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999 marked a watershed moment in the nation’s political history. After enduring nearly 16 years of successive military dictatorships, Nigerians embraced a new era of civil governance with the inauguration of President Olusegun Obasanjo on May 29, 1999. Since then, the country has sustained a democratic system for 26 years. But, this democratic journey has been a complex mix of progress and persistent challenges.
The formal recognition of June 12 as Democracy Day in 2018 by former President Muhammadu Buhari acknowledged a long-standing injustice. The annulment of the 1993 presidential election, Nigeria’s freest, betrayed the democratic aspirations of millions. That it took decades to honour this date reflects the nation’s complex relationship with its democratic memory.
One of the most momentous successes of Nigeria’s democracy has been the uninterrupted civilian rule over the last two and a half decades. The country has witnessed seven general elections, with power transferring peacefully among different political parties. This is particularly notable considering that prior to 1999, no civilian government had completed a full term without military intervention. The peaceful transitions in 2007, 2015, and 2023 are testaments to Nigeria’s evolving democratic maturity.
Electoral participation, while uneven, has also reflected a level of democratic engagement. In 2003, voter turnout stood at about 69 per cent, but this figure dropped to approximately 34.75 per cent in 2023, according to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Although the declining turnout raises concerns, it also highlights the increasing expectations of the electorate, who demand credible and transparent elections.
Another area of progress is the growth of a vibrant and free press. Nigerian media has played a crucial role in holding governments accountable and fostering public discourse. Investigative journalism and civil society activism have exposed corruption and human rights abuses. The rise of social media has further expanded the democratic space, enabling young Nigerians to mobilise and advocate for change, as evidenced by the 2020 #EndSARS protests.
Judicial independence has seen mixed results. On one hand, the judiciary has occasionally demonstrated resilience, such as in landmark rulings that overturned fraudulent elections or curtailed executive excesses. On the other hand, allegations of political interference and corruption within the judiciary persist, undermining public confidence in the legal system’s impartiality.
Nigeria’s democracy has also facilitated the decentralisation of power through the federal system. State governments now wield some autonomy, allowing for experimentation in governance and service delivery. While this has led to innovative policies in some states, it has also entrenched patronage networks and uneven development across the federation.
Despite these successes, Nigeria’s democratic journey faces formidable problems. Electoral integrity remains a critical concern. Reports from election observers, including those from the European Union and ECOWAS, frequently highlight issues such as vote-buying, ballot box snatching, and violence. The introduction of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and electronic transmission of results in 2023 elections showed promise, but technical glitches and alleged manipulations dampened public trust.
Corruption continues to be a pervasive issue. Nigeria ranks 145th out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index, with a score of 25/100. Democratic institutions meant to check graft—such as anti-corruption agencies and the legislature—often struggle due to political interference and weak enforcement mechanisms.
Security challenges have also strained Nigeria’s democracy. Insurgency in the North East, banditry in the North West, separatist agitations in the South East, and herder-farmer conflicts across the Middle Belt have collectively resulted in thousands of deaths and displacements. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2024, Nigeria ranks as the eighth most impacted country by terrorism. The government’s difficulty in ensuring safety erodes public confidence in the state’s capacity and legitimacy.
The economy poses another critical remonstrance. Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita stands at approximately $2,400 as of 2024, with over 40 per cent of the population living below the national poverty line. High unemployment and inflation have fueled discontent and disillusionment with democratic governance, especially among youth. Without addressing economic grievances, the democratic dividend will remain elusive for many Nigerians.
Ethnic and religious divisions further complicate Nigeria’s democratic consolidation. Politicians often exploit identity politics for electoral gains, exacerbating social tensions. Although federal character principles aim to promote inclusiveness, they have also sometimes fostered a quota mentality rather than merit-based appointments.
Gender representation remains inadequate in Nigeria’s democratic institutions. Women occupy less than 10 per cent of seats in the National Assembly, one of the lowest rates globally. Efforts to pass gender parity bills have faced stiff resistance, highlighting deep-seated cultural and institutional barriers to female political participation.
Civil liberties, while constitutionally guaranteed, are under threat. Crackdowns on protesters, restrictions on press freedom, and surveillance of activists reveal an authoritarian streak within the democratic framework. The controversial Twitter ban in 2021 exemplified the country’s willingness to curb digital freedoms, prompting domestic and international criticism.
The political crisis in Rivers State embodies broader democratic struggles. Attempts to control the state through undemocratic means expose weaknesses in federal institutions and the rule of law. Immediate restoration of democratic governance in Rivers State is vital to preserving Nigeria’s democratic integrity and institutional credibility.
Local governments remain under the control of state governors, depriving citizens of grassroots democracy. Last year’s Supreme Court judgment on local government autonomy is promising, but state-level resistance threatens its implementation. Genuine autonomy would bring governance closer to the people and foster democratic innovation.
As we mark Democracy Day, we must honour the sacrifices of Chief M.K.O. Abiola, Kudirat Abiola, Femi Falana, Chief Gani Fawehinmi, Pa Alfred Rewane, President Bola Tinubu, and countless others, who fought for Nigeria’s freedom. As democracy in Nigeria continues to evolve after 26 years, this day should inspire action toward its renewal. With despotism and state failure as real threats, both citizens and leaders must take responsibility—citizens by demanding more, and leaders by delivering. Excuses are no longer acceptable.