Editorial
Justifying Allocations To Intel Agencies
The approval of a N4.87 billion budget for the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) by the National
Assembly (NASS) to track, intercept and monitor calls and messages on mobile devices, including Thuraya and WhatsApp may prove to be counter-productive to the constitutional role of the press. Clearly, that seems to be one of the ploys of the Federal Government to subdue the media.
This amount is said to be part of the N895.8 billion supplementary budget presented by President Muhammadu Buhari and approved by the two chambers of the federal parliament after having increased it by about N87 billion. Of that sum, N1.93 billion was earmarked for “WhatsApp Interception Solution” and N2.93 billion for “Thuraya Interception Solution” – a communications system used for monitoring voice calls or call-related information, SMS, data traffic, among others.
Also, Nigeria’s military intelligence arm, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), has secured N16.8 billion for foreign and national military intelligence. The DIA will as well use the funds to conduct enhanced voice and data monitoring. The funds will be used for interception of communications on tactical mobile geological platforms. The agency will also provide infrastructure and establish cyber intelligence facilities and laboratories across the country.
Federal legislators are also working on a series of legislative initiatives to regulate the media. A number of such bills include the Nigerian Broadcasting Commission (NBC) Act and the Press Council Act (PCA). The Buhari’s government has also recently banned the social media platform, Twitter, as it continues to call for support for regulation of online and mainstream media space in the country.
The purpose of modifying the NBC Act and the PCA Act, is not only to intimidate and stifle the press, but also to muffle the basis of our democracy – freedom of speech. Both amendments seek to empower the Minister of Information to issue licences to print and broadcast media, and penalise journalists and media organisations for offences already covered under the country’s penal and criminal codes.
For instance, Section 3 (e, f, and g) of the NPC amendment bill says the body shall “receive, process and consider applications for the establishment, ownership and operation of print and other related media houses; with the approval of the minister, grant print media and other related licences to any application considered worthy of such; monitor activities of the media and other related media houses to ensure compliance with the National Press Code for professional and ethical conduct, including the Nigeria Union of Journalists.”
The bill also provides the minister with the authority to sanction and revoke the licence of any print media that violates the “National Press Code”. Section 33 (3) of the bill also says that “any person who carries news established to be fake news thereafter, commits an offence and is liable, on conviction, to a fine of N5 million or two years in prison or both.”
And the print media that carried the ‘fake news’ shall be liable to a fine of N10 million and/or closure for one year! This clause deliberately ignores existing media laws that provide for retraction and apology when a media organisation errs in publishing an article. It is yet to be seen what is democratic about this proposed law.
In addition, the currently conceived bill aims to regulate internet broadcasting and all online media organisations through a series of broadcasting licences, including licences for live content or Over the Top Television (OTT). Attempting to crack down on online media criticism is patently reckless, and it flies in the face of liberal democracy.
We are totally confident that all the endorsed funds and the review of media laws are geared towards enabling security operatives to haunt journalists and to restrict freedom of information in the country. This is actually another strategy to limit criticism of the government. Why are the authorities not thinking about utilising the enormous funds earmarked for media repression to develop other sectors of the country consistently yearning for consideration?
No opposition party in Nigeria has benefited more from press freedom than the All Progressives Congress (APC). As APC’s spokesperson at the time, the current Information Minister, Alhaji Lai Mohammed, had access to traditional and online media at all times, and his views were widely publicised. Therefore, it is paradoxical that these obnoxious bills are in the process of becoming laws.
Over the last six years, the NASS has adopted, revised or proposed no fewer than five pieces of legislation, all of which have the capacity to restrict the press. These include the Cybercrime Act, the Frivolous Petitions Bill of 2015, the Hate Speech Bill, and the Prevention of Internet Falsehood and Manipulation Bill of 2019. Each of them looks scary enough.
The NASS or any other related legislature must deal with various anti-media bills carefully to avoid overheating the already tense polity. In the past, even under the military regime, Nigerian leaders tried to block the press, but met severe resistance; and only successfully pitched the government against the people and the media and created social unrest.
Certainly, like traditional media platforms, there could be abuse, and this invariably requires some regulation. But given the inherent nature of social media, extreme care must be taken to prevent the child from being dumped with the bathwater. The largely unsuccessful experience of some developed countries that have sought to reduce social media excesses in some respects is very instructive.
In any event, there are enough existing laws in the country’s statute books on defamation, privacy, libel and slander to protect public and private individuals ordinarily. It is important to ensure that the passage of another law on similar matters is not excessive, eventually resulting in needless duplication of laws.
There is no question that the government has to regulate the media in line with extant laws, especially in this period when the country is beset with existential, economic, political and security problems. In fact, the time demands that all security agencies, including the intelligence community, are up and doing.
However, we firmly insist that the massive allocations to the different intelligence services in the country should not be a cover-up to fight the media. Instead, they must be put to good use to achieve the presumed objective of combating subversive activities, crime and criminal elements. No society can stand up to a subjugated press.
The recent massacre in Yelewata, Benue State, ranks among Nigeria’s deadliest attacks of
2025. While official figures put the death toll at 59, media reports and Amnesty International estimate between 100 and 200 fatalities. This atrocity extends a decade-long pattern of violence in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, where Beacon Security data records 1,043 deaths in Benue alone between May 2023 and May 2025.
President Tinubu’s visit on 18 June—four days after the 14 June attack—has drawn sharp criticism for its lateness. This delay echoes a history of inadequate responses, with Human Rights Watch documenting similar inaction in Plateau and Kaduna states since 2013, fuelling a culture of impunity. The attack lasted over two hours without meaningful security intervention, despite claims of swift action.
The violence bore hallmarks of genocide, with survivors recounting systematic house burnings and executions. More than 2.2 million people have been displaced in the region since 2019 due to comparable attacks. Data show Benue’s agricultural output falls by 0.21 per cent in crops and 0.31 per cent in livestock for every 1 per cent rise in violence.
Security forces continue to underperform. No arrests were made following the Easter attacks in April (56 killed) or May’s Gwer West massacre (42 killed). During his visit, Tinubu questioned publicly why no suspects had been detained four days after Yelewata, highlighting entrenched accountability failures.
The roots of the conflict are complex, with climate change pushing northern herders south and 77 per cent of Benue’s population reliant on agriculture. A Tiv community leader described the violence as “calculated land-grabbing” rather than mere clashes, with over 500 deaths recorded since 2019.
Government interventions have largely fallen short. The 2018 federal task force and 2025 Forest Guards initiative failed to curb violence. Tinubu’s newly announced committee of ex-governors and traditional rulers has been met with scepticism given the litany of past unkept promises.
The economic fallout is severe. Benue’s status as Nigeria’s “food basket” is crumbling as farms are destroyed and farmers displaced. This worsens the nation’s food crisis, with hunger surges in 2023-2024 directly linked to farming disruptions caused by insecurity.
Citizens demanding justice have been met with force; protesters faced police tear gas, and the State Assembly conceded total failure in safeguarding lives, admitting that the governor, deputy, and 32 lawmakers had all neglected their constitutional responsibilities.
The massacre has drawn international condemnation. Pope Leo XIV decried the “terrible massacre,” while the UN called for an investigation. The hashtag “200 Nigerians” trended worldwide on X, with many contrasting Nigeria’s slow response to India’s swift action following a plane crash with similar fatalities.
Nigeria’s centralised security system is clearly overwhelmed. A single police force is tasked with covering 36 states and 774 local government areas for a population exceeding 200 million. Between 2021 and 2023 alone, 29,828 killings and 15,404 kidnappings were recorded nationally. Proposals for state police, floated since January 2025, remain stalled.
Other populous nations offer alternative models. Canada’s provincial police, India’s state forces, and Indonesia’s municipal units demonstrate the effectiveness of decentralised policing. Nigeria’s centralised structure creates intelligence and response gaps, worsened by the distance—both physical and bureaucratic—from Abuja to affected communities.
The immediate aftermath is dire: 21 IDP camps in Benue are overwhelmed, and a humanitarian crisis is deepening. The State Assembly declared three days of mourning (18-20 June), but survivors lack sufficient medical aid. Tragically, many of those killed were already displaced by earlier violence.
A lasting solution requires a multi-pronged approach, including targeted security deployment, regulated grazing land, and full enforcement of Benue’s 2017 Anti-Open Grazing Law. The National Economic Council’s failure to prioritise state police in May 2025 represents a missed chance for reform.
Without decisive intervention, trends suggest conditions will worsen. More than 20,000 Nigerians have been killed and 13,000 kidnapped nationwide in 2025 alone. As Governor Hyacinth Alia stressed during Tinubu’s visit, state police may be the only viable path forward. All 36 states have submitted proposals supporting decentralisation—a crucial step towards breaking Nigeria’s vicious cycle of violence.
Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999 marked a watershed moment in the nation’s political history. After enduring nearly 16 years of successive military dictatorships, Nigerians embraced a new era of civil governance with the inauguration of President Olusegun Obasanjo on May 29, 1999. Since then, the country has sustained a democratic system for 26 years. But, this democratic journey has been a complex mix of progress and persistent challenges.
The formal recognition of June 12 as Democracy Day in 2018 by former President Muhammadu Buhari acknowledged a long-standing injustice. The annulment of the 1993 presidential election, Nigeria’s freest, betrayed the democratic aspirations of millions. That it took decades to honour this date reflects the nation’s complex relationship with its democratic memory.
One of the most momentous successes of Nigeria’s democracy has been the uninterrupted civilian rule over the last two and a half decades. The country has witnessed seven general elections, with power transferring peacefully among different political parties. This is particularly notable considering that prior to 1999, no civilian government had completed a full term without military intervention. The peaceful transitions in 2007, 2015, and 2023 are testaments to Nigeria’s evolving democratic maturity.
Electoral participation, while uneven, has also reflected a level of democratic engagement. In 2003, voter turnout stood at about 69 per cent, but this figure dropped to approximately 34.75 per cent in 2023, according to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Although the declining turnout raises concerns, it also highlights the increasing expectations of the electorate, who demand credible and transparent elections.
Another area of progress is the growth of a vibrant and free press. Nigerian media has played a crucial role in holding governments accountable and fostering public discourse. Investigative journalism and civil society activism have exposed corruption and human rights abuses. The rise of social media has further expanded the democratic space, enabling young Nigerians to mobilise and advocate for change, as evidenced by the 2020 #EndSARS protests.
Judicial independence has seen mixed results. On one hand, the judiciary has occasionally demonstrated resilience, such as in landmark rulings that overturned fraudulent elections or curtailed executive excesses. On the other hand, allegations of political interference and corruption within the judiciary persist, undermining public confidence in the legal system’s impartiality.
Nigeria’s democracy has also facilitated the decentralisation of power through the federal system. State governments now wield some autonomy, allowing for experimentation in governance and service delivery. While this has led to innovative policies in some states, it has also entrenched patronage networks and uneven development across the federation.
Despite these successes, Nigeria’s democratic journey faces formidable problems. Electoral integrity remains a critical concern. Reports from election observers, including those from the European Union and ECOWAS, frequently highlight issues such as vote-buying, ballot box snatching, and violence. The introduction of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and electronic transmission of results in 2023 elections showed promise, but technical glitches and alleged manipulations dampened public trust.
Corruption continues to be a pervasive issue. Nigeria ranks 145th out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index, with a score of 25/100. Democratic institutions meant to check graft—such as anti-corruption agencies and the legislature—often struggle due to political interference and weak enforcement mechanisms.
Security challenges have also strained Nigeria’s democracy. Insurgency in the North East, banditry in the North West, separatist agitations in the South East, and herder-farmer conflicts across the Middle Belt have collectively resulted in thousands of deaths and displacements. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2024, Nigeria ranks as the eighth most impacted country by terrorism. The government’s difficulty in ensuring safety erodes public confidence in the state’s capacity and legitimacy.
The economy poses another critical remonstrance. Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita stands at approximately $2,400 as of 2024, with over 40 per cent of the population living below the national poverty line. High unemployment and inflation have fueled discontent and disillusionment with democratic governance, especially among youth. Without addressing economic grievances, the democratic dividend will remain elusive for many Nigerians.
Ethnic and religious divisions further complicate Nigeria’s democratic consolidation. Politicians often exploit identity politics for electoral gains, exacerbating social tensions. Although federal character principles aim to promote inclusiveness, they have also sometimes fostered a quota mentality rather than merit-based appointments.
Gender representation remains inadequate in Nigeria’s democratic institutions. Women occupy less than 10 per cent of seats in the National Assembly, one of the lowest rates globally. Efforts to pass gender parity bills have faced stiff resistance, highlighting deep-seated cultural and institutional barriers to female political participation.
Civil liberties, while constitutionally guaranteed, are under threat. Crackdowns on protesters, restrictions on press freedom, and surveillance of activists reveal an authoritarian streak within the democratic framework. The controversial Twitter ban in 2021 exemplified the country’s willingness to curb digital freedoms, prompting domestic and international criticism.
The political crisis in Rivers State embodies broader democratic struggles. Attempts to control the state through undemocratic means expose weaknesses in federal institutions and the rule of law. Immediate restoration of democratic governance in Rivers State is vital to preserving Nigeria’s democratic integrity and institutional credibility.
Local governments remain under the control of state governors, depriving citizens of grassroots democracy. Last year’s Supreme Court judgment on local government autonomy is promising, but state-level resistance threatens its implementation. Genuine autonomy would bring governance closer to the people and foster democratic innovation.
As we mark Democracy Day, we must honour the sacrifices of Chief M.K.O. Abiola, Kudirat Abiola, Femi Falana, Chief Gani Fawehinmi, Pa Alfred Rewane, President Bola Tinubu, and countless others, who fought for Nigeria’s freedom. As democracy in Nigeria continues to evolve after 26 years, this day should inspire action toward its renewal. With despotism and state failure as real threats, both citizens and leaders must take responsibility—citizens by demanding more, and leaders by delivering. Excuses are no longer acceptable.