Computation Of Term Of Imprisonment

Case: AYI vs. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2020) LCN/14688(CA)
Issue:  Whether where an accused person has been in custody before his trial, order of court refusing him bail and conviction, his term of imprisonment should be computed from when his detention commenced in respect of the case(Issue is mine)
Principle:
“Paragraph 4(a) of the further and better affidavit contained in page 281 of the record to which the appellant referred in the course of arguments in the appeal deposed that the appellant was arrested by the official(s) of the EFCC on 30.10.2017.
The respondent did not challenge the said paragraph 4(a) of the further and better affidavit. Likewise, paragraph 4(a) of the affidavit in support of the summons for bail deposed to on 31.01.2018 which is contained in page 259 of the record to the effect that the appellant was arrested by officials of the EFCC on 30.10.2017 and that since the date of his arrest he has been in the custody of the EFCC where he was detained for 78 days without arraignment.
Unchallenged pieces of affidavit evidence are accepted as establishing the deposition contained therein vide Obande Obeya v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc (2012) All FWLR (Pt.636) 544 following Unanganga v. M.G., Imo State (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.59) 123.
The summons for bail filed on 31.01.18 was refused on 26.02.18 vide pages 287 — 289 of the record. The appellant was thus ordered to be remanded in prison custody by the Court below until his conviction and sentence to a term of seven (7) years in prison on 04.05.18 vide pages 309 — 311 of the record.
In sentencing the appellant to seven (7) years-in prison on 04.05.2018, the Court below directed that the term of imprisonment should start on the date of the appellant’s remand in prison custody by the Court below which was on 26.02.2018 vide pages 287 — 289 of the record.
Section 315 of the ACJL stipulates that a sentence of imprisonment takes effect from and includes the whole of the day of the date on which it was pronounced provided that in reckoning the length of imprisonment, the convicting Court shall direct that any period of detention prior to conviction shall be taken into consideration.
Although the phrase ‘detention’ is not defined in the ACJL, I agree with its English dictionary definitions of restraint, custody, confinement or compulsory delay supplied (supra) by the appellant.
Thus in Banjo v. State (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt.1381) 455 at pages 462 and 467 where His Lordship, Muntaka-Coomassie, JSC,  (now of blessed memory) held in the lead judgment that it was both humane, legal and absolutely correct for the Court to direct that the sentence of 21 years in prison be back-dated to commence on 15.01.2000 when the appellant in that case lost his liberty on account of the case.
Also, it was held by the Supreme Court in the case of  Oruche v. COP Northern Region (1963) that the defendant if convicted could ask the convicting Court to take into account the period he lost his liberty on account of the case.
The Court below was therefore in error when it did not start the computation of the sentence of seven (7) years in prison it had imposed on the appellant on 30.10.17 which was the time the appellant lost his liberty on account of the case.
The Court below thus misapprehended the facts and the law on exercise of its discretion to direct the length of the sentence of imprisonment to include the period of detention of the appellant.
The Supreme Court held in the case of Enekebe v. Enekebe (1964) NMLR 42 at 45 following the English case of *Blunt v. Blunt (1943) AC 517 at 522 that an appeal Court can interfere with the exercise of discretion by a trial Court acted under a misapprehension of fact in that it omitted to take into account matters that are relevant and therefore based its discretion on wrong or inadequate materials. See also the series of cases (supra) cited by the appellant.
Consequently, I find substance in the appeal with respect only to the date of commencement of the sentence of seven (7) years in prison imposed on the appellant by the Court below and hereby allow the appeal only to the extent of the date of commencement of the sentence of seven (7) years in prison and set aside the commencement date of 26.02.2018, when the Court below ordered the appellant to be remanded in prison custody and substitute therefor the date of 30.10.2017 when the appellant was detained by the respondent through the EFCC as the date of commencement of the sentence of seven (7) years imprisonment passed on the appellant by the Court below.” Per IKYEGH, JCA.
Atsor wrote from N. Ngbea & Co Chambers, Makurdi, Benue State.

By: King Onunwor with reports from James Atsor