Relationship Between Locus Standi And Jurisdiction (111)

On When identity of land in issue

It is the duty of a claimant to prove clearly and
unequivocally the precise area to which his claim relates. However, this duty
does not arise if the defendant in his statement of defence does not dispute the
identity of the property or the location specifically make it an issue in his
pleadings by by the claimant. In the instant case, the appellant property in
dispute in Ikoyi, Lagos. The amended statement of claim also specifically
mentioned the Sharada, Kano property and left no doubt as to the properties
dealt with in exhibit “MM2”. The appellant’s further amended statement of
defence and counter-claim copiously particiularised the properties covered by
exhibit “MM2”. The evidence on the properties also did not create any doubt
that the parties were ad idem on the identities of the properties in
contention. (Dada v Dosunmu (2006) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1010) 134; Akinterinwa v. Umoh
(1999) 11 NWLR (Pt.627) 349; Gbadamosi
v. Dairo (2007) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1021) 282 referred to.) Pp.32-33, paras.
D-B).

On Need to describe land in dispute with certainty in action
for declaration of title to land –

In a case for declaration of any right or title over land,
the land must be described with certainty so that the parties are ad idem as to
its identity. Once parties are ad idem, there can be no room for a finding that
the identity of property in dispute is unascertainable. In the instant case,
the action was for rescission of contract due to fraudulent misrepresentation
and not for declaration of title to land. (Auta v. Ibe (2003) 13 NWLR (Pt. 837)
247; Makanjuola v. Balogun (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 108) 192 referred to.) P. 33,
paras. C-F)

On purport of decision in Idundun v. Okumagba (1976) 10 SC
227 –

The case of Idundun v. Okumagba (1976) 10 SC 227 deals with
the five ways in which ownership of land can be proved and not with the ways of
acquiring title to land. In other words, the case is about matters of evidence
to be adduced or how to discharge the burden of proof rather and not about the
substantive law on acquisition of title. The principles laid down in the case
cannot be applied mechanically without recourse to facts before the court.
(Adisa v. Oyinwola (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 674) 116 referred to.) P. 42, paras,
D-F0

On Whether vendor of land can retract from contract for sale
of land after receiving consideration –

Where a party entered into an agreement with his eyes open
and received consideration which he never returned to the other contracting
party, equity will come in to stop him from retracting from the agreement. He
cannot be allowed at that stage, having benefited, to refuse to give
consideration to the other party by passing title of the property to him.
(Dantata v. Dantata (2002) 4 NWLR (Pt. 756) 144; Okafor v. Soyemi (2001) 2 NWLR
(Pt. 698) 465 referred to.) Pp. 42-43, paras. F-B).

On Conditions for successful plea of laches and acquiescence
–

For the doctrine of laches and acquiescence to succeed, it
must be established that such laches and acquiescence amount to fraud. The
elements which constitute such requisite fraud are:

(a) the plaintiff (person) who set up the doctrine of laches
and acquiescence must have made a mistake as to his legal rights;

(b) such a plaintiff (person) must have expended some money
or must have done some act on the faith of his mistaken belief;

(c) the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must
also know of the existence of his own right which is inconsistent with the
right claimed by the plaintiff, as doctrine of acquiescence is founded upon
conduct with knowledge of one’s legal rights;

(d) the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must
know of the plaintiff’s mistaken belief of his rights;

(e) the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must
have encouraged the plaintiff in his expenditure of money or in the other acts,
which he has done either directly or by abstaining from ascertaining his legal
rights.

(Kayode v. Odutola (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 725) 684 referred
to.) P.43, paras. C-G)

On Nature of interest in land conferred by receipt of
purchase price and delivery of possession –

The receipt of purchase price coupled with the delivery of
possession confers an equitable interest in landed property. In the instant
case, the receipt of the purchase price by the 1st respondent coupled with the
delivery of possession by him to the 2nd respondent conferred on the 2nd
respondent an equitable interest in the Ikoyi, Lagos property. (Nsiege v.
Mgbemena (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1042) 364; Thompson v. Arowolo (2003) 7 NWLR (Pt.
818) 163 referred to.) P.44, paras. C-D)

On whether equitable interest in land can be passed –

A person with an equitable interest in land which is capable
of being turned into a legal estate by specific performance can pass the
equitable title to another who would acquire the legal estate after the
specific performance. In the instant case, the 2nd respondent had acquired an
equitable interest in the Ikoyi, Lagos property and it would be inequitable to
deprive him of it. (Pp. 45, paras. C-D; 46, para. B)On Application of principle
of nemo dat quod non habet –

Where a seller is shown as not having title in him at the
time of sale, the contract of sale must be vitiated on application of the
principle of nemo dat quod non habet. Such contract is void ab initio. In the
instant case, the principle was not applicable to the facts of the case. If the
2nd respondent had indicated in exhibit “MM2” that he had legal estate to pass
on to the 1st respondent at the time of sale which turned out to be false, the
contract in respect of the Sharada, Kano property would have been vitiated.
(Mohammed v. Klargester (Nig.) Ltd (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 787) 335 referred to.)
Pp. 44-45, paras. H-B)

On Basis of principle of bona fide purchaser for value
without notice –

The whole basis of the equitable principle of bona fide
purchaser for value without notice is to protect a purchaser from the fraud of
his vendor. If a purchaser fails to investigate title at all, he is fixed with
constructive notice of everything that he would have discovered had he investigated
the whole title. In the instant case, the appellant never consulted with the
1st respondent before the purchase but merely acted on the presumption that all
was well and on the representation made to him by the 2nd respondent. (Omosanya
v. Admin. Gen., E.C.S. (1978) 1 SC 25 referred to.) P. 48, paras. B-D)

On Types of notice –

There are three types of notice and they are as follows:

(a) actual notice, which is when a person has actual notice
of all facts of which he has actual knowledge however that knowledge was
acquired;

(b) constructive notice by which the court of chancery
insisted that a purchaser should inquire about equitable interest with no less
diligence than about legal interest which he could ignore at his own peril; and

(c) imputed notice, which is the actual or constructive
notice imputed to a purchaser where the notice was received by an agent
employed by the purchaser.

In the instant case, what the evidence suggested was a lack
of notice or knowledge of the controversy rather than of the legal interest of
the 1st respondent. (Animashaun v. Olojo (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 154) 111 referred
to.) (p.48, paras. D-H)

On principles governing protection of property and
protection of commercial transactions –

The law recognizes the protection of property, that is, no
one can give a better title than he himself possess. The law also recognizes
the protection of commercial transactions, that is, the person who takes in
good faith and for value without notice should get good title. (P.49, paras.
A-B)

On when court will imply performance of contract within
reasonable time –

In a contractual relation where time is of essence in
respect of performance of a contract, the law in respect of performance within
a reasonable time, will imply performance within a reasonable time, although
the contract between parties is silent in respect of time for performance.
Thus, where no term concerning time for performance was agreed upon by parties,
it is the duty of the court to read into the contract a term that performance
was agreed to be given within a reasonable time. The reasonable time would
depend on the circumstances of each case. In the instant case, because of the
circumstances of the 2nd respondent and the fact that specific performance was
dependent on other people extraneous to the agreement, the court could not hold
that an unreasonable time was taken in ensuring transfer of the Sharada, Kano
property. (N.B.C.I. v. Integrated Gas (Nig.) Ltd. (2005) 4 NWLR (Pt. 916) 617;
Edem v. Canon Balls Ltd. *2005) 12 NWLR (Pt. 938) 27 referred to.) Pp. 45-46,
paras. E-F; para. A)

On whether claim in respect of agreement can be made against
party with whom there is no privity of contract –

A claim in respect of an agreement cannot be made against a
party with whom ther is no privity of contract. In the instant case, the
appellant could not succeed in his counter-claim against the 1st respondent in
respect of the Ikoyi, Lagos property as there was no privity of contract
between them. (Pp. 47-48, paras. H-A)

Per OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A. at pages 47-48, paras. H-B:

“As I held earlier in this judgment, the two agreements in
respect of the two properties are distinct. I have also held that the equity of
this case is in favour of the 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent can succeed in
a counterclaim against the 1st respondent. However, I do not think the
appellant can succeed in a counter-claim against the 1st respondent. In the first
instance, there is no privity of contract between the 1st and 2nd defendant
hence, the appellant cannot claim against the 1st respondent”.